Farsightedly Stable Matchings
We study the properties of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in application to matching models. We show that the result by Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) for hedonic games can be extended to a general matching with contracts framework: a collection of singleton stable sets constitutes a weak core of the matching with contracts game. We also show that singleton stable sets are invariant under different contractual languages.
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2000-12, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
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- Hideo Konishi & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Credible Group-Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 570, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 19 Jan 2005.
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