Intense Network Competition
First, we demonstrate how unregulated price setting in mobile telecommunications may lead to monopolization, even when networks are highly substitutable. Second, we demonstrate that a menu of structural rules, including (i) mandatory interconnection, (ii) reciprocal access prices and (iii) a ban on price discrimination of calls to other networks, may restore competition. This regulation requires neither demand data nor information about call costs.
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- Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P., 2001.
"Using 'bill and keep' interconnect arrangements to soften network competition,"
Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 413-420, June.
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"A Retail Benchmarking Approach to Eficient Two-Way Access Pricing,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
717.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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- Wouter Dessein, 2000.
"Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing,"
CIG Working Papers
FS IV 00-22, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
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