The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Agent Behavior and Efficiency in Open and Closed Organizations
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- Duncan Holthausen & Theofanis Tsoulouhas, 2008. "The good, the bad and the ugly: agent behavior and efficiency in open and closed organizations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(1), pages 73-97, April.
References listed on IDEAS
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004.
"The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
- Eric Maskin, 2003. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," Economics Working Papers 0020, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
More about this item
Keywordsorganizations; agent behavior; organizational efficiency; screening; sorting; auditing;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-BEC-2004-11-07 (Business Economics)
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