What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of Drug Offenders and Concurrent Jurisdiction
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- Edward L. Glaeser & Anne Morrison Peihl, 1998. "What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of Drug Offenders and Concurrent Jurisdiction," JCPR Working Papers 29, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
References listed on IDEAS
- Glaeser, Edward L & Glendon, Spencer, 1998.
"Who Owns Guns? Criminals, Victims, and the Culture of Violence,"
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American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 458-462, May.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Spence Glendon, 1998. "Who Owns Guns? Criminals, Victims and the Culture of Violence," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1822, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Kessler, Daniel P & Piehl, Anne Morrison, 1998.
"The Role of Discretion in the Criminal Justice System,"
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Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 256-276, October.
- Daniel P. Kessler & Anne Morrison Piehl, 1997. "The Role of Discretion in the Criminal Justice System," NBER Working Papers 6261, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Richard Boylan & Cheryl Xiaoning Long, 2000. "Size, Monitoring and Plea Rate: An Examination of United States Attorneys," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0089, Econometric Society.
- Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, 2000.
"The Role of Deportation in the Incarceration of Immigrants,"
NBER Chapters,in: Issues in the Economics of Immigration, pages 351-386
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, 1999. "The Role of Deportation in the Incarceration of Immigrants," NBER Working Papers 6974, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Francisco González & Carlos Esteban Posada, 2001. "Criminalidad, violencia y gasto público en defensa, justicia y seguridad en Colombia," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 3(4), pages 78-102, January-J.
More about this item
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-PUB-1998-07-06 (Public Finance)
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