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Punishment should fit the crime: an assessment of the French reform of minimum mandatory penalties

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  • Bruno Deffains
  • Roberto Galbiati
  • Sebastien Rouillon

Abstract

We study the effects of minimum mandatory sentences when judges are at least minimally averse to error and/or follow some "penalty should fit the crime" heuristic. We apply our analysis to the 2007 reform of the French Penal Code. We show that the introduction of minimum mandatory sentences in this context may backfire inducing more crime in the long run. Judges may prefer to acquit a criminal than convicting him to a sentence reputed too high.
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Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Deffains & Roberto Galbiati & Sebastien Rouillon, 2009. "Punishment should fit the crime: an assessment of the French reform of minimum mandatory penalties," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 8(3), pages 161-175, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:portec:v:8:y:2009:i:3:p:161-175
    DOI: 10.1007/s10258-009-0050-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pallage, Stephane & Demougin, Dominique, 2003. "Limiting court behavior: a case for high minimum sentences and low maximum ones," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 309-321, September.
    2. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    3. Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes, 1974. "Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck74-1.
    4. Kessler, Daniel P & Piehl, Anne Morrison, 1998. "The Role of Discretion in the Criminal Justice System," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 256-276, October.
    5. William M. Landes, 1974. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 164-214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Law-and-economics; Crime; Punishment; Judge behavior; K42;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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