Integration of the International Capital Markets: The Size of Government and Tax Coordination
International-capital market integration has become a key policy issue in the prospective integration of Europe of 1992. In this context this paper provides a theoretical analysis of the effects of relaxing restrictions on the international flow of capital on the fiscal branch of government: the optimal provision of public goods, the structure of taxation and income redistribution policies. Concerning issues of interdependent economies the paper analyzes the scope of tax coordination. The major findings are: (a) with no administrative barriers to capital flows the optimal policy is to tax income from investment abroad and from investments at home at the same time; (b) the cost of public funds falls and the supply of public goods rises if restrictions on international capital flows are relaxed: (c) the amount of income redistributions increases with the international capital market liberalization; (d) some minimal degree of tax coordination (such as origin-based or source-based tax schemes) is essential for the existence of an equilibrium in an integrated world economy.
|Date of creation:||Feb 1989|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as "Integration of International Capital Markets: The Size of Government and Tax Coordination." From Taxation in the Global Economy, edited by Assaf Razin and Joel Slemrod, pp. 331-348. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990.|
|Note:||PE ITI IFM|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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