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Government Guarantees and the Valuation of American Banks

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  • Andrew G. Atkeson
  • Adrien d'Avernas
  • Andrea L. Eisfeldt
  • Pierre-Olivier Weill

Abstract

Banks' ratio of the market value to book value of their equity was close to 1 until the 1990s, then more than doubled during the 1996-2007 period, and fell again to values close to 1 after the 2008 financial crisis. Sarin and Summers (2016) and Chousakos and Gorton (2017) argue that the drop in banks' market-to-book ratio since the crisis is due to a loss in bank franchise value or profitability. In this paper we argue that banks' market-to-book ratio is the sum of two components: franchise value and the value of government guarantees. We empirically decompose the ratio between these two components and find that a large portion of the variation in this ratio over time is due to changes in the value of government guarantees.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew G. Atkeson & Adrien d'Avernas & Andrea L. Eisfeldt & Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2018. "Government Guarantees and the Valuation of American Banks," NBER Working Papers 24706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24706
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    3. Gomes, João F. & Grotteria, Marco & Wachter, Jessica A., 2023. "Foreseen risks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    4. Whited, Toni M. & Wu, Yufeng & Xiao, Kairong, 2021. "Low interest rates and risk incentives for banks with market power," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 155-174.
    5. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp, 2022. "The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(4), pages 2423-2470, August.
    6. Granja, João & Makridis, Christos & Yannelis, Constantine & Zwick, Eric, 2022. "Did the paycheck protection program hit the target?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 725-761.
    7. Chirinko, Robert, 2023. "What went wrong? The Puerto Rican debt crisis, the “Treasury Put,” and the failure of market discipline," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    8. Katerina Ivanov & James Schulte & Weidong Tian & Kevin Tseng, 2021. "An Equilibrium-Based Measure of Systemic Risk," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(9), pages 1-24, September.
    9. Chernobai, Anna & Ozdagli, Ali & Wang, Jianlin, 2021. "Business complexity and risk management: Evidence from operational risk events in U.S. bank holding companies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 418-440.
    10. Bachas, Natalie & Kim, Olivia S. & Yannelis, Constantine, 2021. "Loan guarantees and credit supply," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(3), pages 872-894.
    11. João F. Gomes & Marco Grotteria & Jessica Wachter, 2018. "Foreseen Risks," NBER Working Papers 25277, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Morteza Alaeddini & Philippe Madiès & Paul J. Reaidy & Julie Dugdale, 2023. "Interbank money market concerns and actors’ strategies—A systematic review of 21st century literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 573-654, April.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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