IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/24706.html

Government Guarantees and the Valuation of American Banks

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew G. Atkeson
  • Adrien d'Avernas
  • Andrea L. Eisfeldt
  • Pierre-Olivier Weill

Abstract

Banks' ratio of the market value to book value of their equity was close to 1 until the 1990s, then more than doubled during the 1996-2007 period, and fell again to values close to 1 after the 2008 financial crisis. Sarin and Summers (2016) and Chousakos and Gorton (2017) argue that the drop in banks' market-to-book ratio since the crisis is due to a loss in bank franchise value or profitability. In this paper we argue that banks' market-to-book ratio is the sum of two components: franchise value and the value of government guarantees. We empirically decompose the ratio between these two components and find that a large portion of the variation in this ratio over time is due to changes in the value of government guarantees.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew G. Atkeson & Adrien d'Avernas & Andrea L. Eisfeldt & Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2018. "Government Guarantees and the Valuation of American Banks," NBER Working Papers 24706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24706
    Note: AP IFM ME
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w24706.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gomes, João F. & Grotteria, Marco & Wachter, Jessica A., 2023. "Foreseen risks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    2. Whited, Toni M. & Wu, Yufeng & Xiao, Kairong, 2021. "Low interest rates and risk incentives for banks with market power," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 155-174.
    3. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp, 2022. "The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(4), pages 2423-2470, August.
    4. Malherbe, Frederic & McMahon, Michael, 2024. "Beyond Pangloss: Financial sector origins of inefficient economic booms," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    5. Chirinko, Robert, 2023. "What went wrong? The Puerto Rican debt crisis, the “Treasury Put,” and the failure of market discipline," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    6. Jiang, Erica Xuewei & Matvos, Gregor & Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit, 2024. "Monetary tightening and U.S. bank fragility in 2023: Mark-to-market losses and uninsured depositor runs?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    7. Katerina Ivanov & James Schulte & Weidong Tian & Kevin Tseng, 2021. "An Equilibrium-Based Measure of Systemic Risk," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(9), pages 1-24, September.
    8. Buchetti, Bruno & Miquel-Flores, Ixart & Perdichizzi, Salvatore & Reghezza, Alessio & Lin, Luca X., 2024. "Loan guarantee and portfolio greening: evidence from European credit registers," Working Paper Series 2916, European Central Bank.
    9. Chernobai, Anna & Ozdagli, Ali & Wang, Jianlin, 2021. "Business complexity and risk management: Evidence from operational risk events in U.S. bank holding companies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 418-440.
    10. Julian Kozlowski & Laura Veldkamp & Venky Venkateswaran, 2020. "The Tail That Wags the Economy: Beliefs and Persistent Stagnation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(8), pages 2839-2879.
    11. Bachas, Natalie & Kim, Olivia S. & Yannelis, Constantine, 2021. "Loan guarantees and credit supply," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(3), pages 872-894.
    12. Falato, Antonio & Iercosan, Diana & Zikes, Filip, 2025. "Banks as regulated traders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    13. Morteza Alaeddini & Philippe Madiès & Paul J. Reaidy & Julie Dugdale, 2023. "Interbank money market concerns and actors’ strategies—A systematic review of 21st century literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 573-654, April.
    14. Kalimipalli, Madhu & Morohunfolu, Olaleye & Ramachandran, Shankar, 2024. "Do repeated government infusions help financial stability? Evidence from an emerging market," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    15. Stephen Matteo Miller, 2024. "How much would it cost to guarantee debt for all publicly traded U.S. corporations?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(4), pages 604-622, October.
    16. Altavilla, Carlo & Begenau, Juliane & Burlon, Lorenzo & Maruhn, Franziska, 2024. "Determinants of bank performance: evidence from replicating portfolios," Working Paper Series 2937, European Central Bank.
    17. Dempsey, Kyle & Faria-e-Castro, Miguel, 2025. "A quantitative analysis of bank lending relationships," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    18. Granja, João & Makridis, Christos & Yannelis, Constantine & Zwick, Eric, 2022. "Did the paycheck protection program hit the target?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 725-761.
    19. Milton Harris & Christian Opp & Marcus Opp, 2020. "The Aggregate Demand for Bank Capital," NBER Working Papers 27858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24706. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.