Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy
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- Edward L. Glaeser & Andrew Hillis & Scott Duke Kominers & Michael Luca, 2016. "Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 114-118, May.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
- D04 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation; Implementation; Evaluation
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- L88 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Government Policy
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General
- R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-URE-2016-04-09 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
- NEP-URE-2016-04-16 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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