IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/21565.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Price of Responsibility: The Impact of Health Reform on Non-Poor Uninsureds

Author

Listed:
  • Mark Pauly
  • Adam Leive
  • Scott Harrington

Abstract

This paper estimates the change in net (of subsidy) financial burden (“the price of responsibility”) and in welfare that would be experienced by a large nationally representative sample of the “non-poor” uninsured if they were to purchase Silver or Bronze plans on the ACA exchanges. The sample is the set of full-year uninsured persons represented in the Current Population Survey for the pre-ACA period with incomes above 138 percent of the federal poverty level. The estimated change in financial burden compares out-of-pocket payments by income stratum in the pre-ACA period with the sum of premiums (net of subsidy) and expected cost sharing (net of subsidy) for benchmark Silver and Bronze plans, under various assumptions about the extent of increased spending associated with obtaining coverage. In addition to changes in the financial burden, our welfare estimates incorporate the value of additional care consumed and the change in risk premiums for changes in exposure to out-of-pocket payments associated with coverage, under various assumptions about risk aversion. We find that the average financial burden will increase for all income levels once insured. Subsidy-eligible persons with incomes below 250 percent of the poverty threshold likely experience welfare improvements that offset the higher financial burden, depending on assumptions about risk aversion and the value of additional consumption of medical care. However, even under the most optimistic assumptions, close to half of the formerly uninsured (especially those with higher incomes) experience both higher financial burden and lower estimated welfare; indicating a positive “price of responsibility” for complying with the individual mandate. The percentage of the sample with estimated welfare increases is close to matching observed take-up rates by the previously uninsured in the exchanges.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Pauly & Adam Leive & Scott Harrington, 2015. "The Price of Responsibility: The Impact of Health Reform on Non-Poor Uninsureds," NBER Working Papers 21565, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21565
    Note: EH
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21565.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jason Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, 2011. "Choice Inconsistencies among the Elderly: Evidence from Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1180-1210, June.
    2. Heiss, Florian & Leive, Adam & McFadden, Daniel & Winter, Joachim, 2013. "Plan selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence from administrative data," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1325-1344.
    3. Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, 2007. "Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 745-788, June.
    4. Benjamin R. Handel & Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2015. "Health Insurance for "Humans": Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2449-2500, August.
    5. Amy Finkelstein & Nathaniel Hendren & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2019. "The Value of Medicaid: Interpreting Results from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(6), pages 2836-2874.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Julie Shi, 2017. "Efficiency in Plan Choice with Risk Adjustment and Risk-Based Pricing in Health Insurance Exchanges," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 42(1), pages 79-113, January.
    2. Naomi Zewde, 2021. "Did Marketplace coverage really offer financial protection? Financial gains from the Affordable Care Act's private insurance policies among the previously uninsured," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(2), pages 413-427, June.
    3. Jesse M. Hinde, 2017. "Incentive(less)? The Effectiveness of Tax Credits and Cost-Sharing Subsidies in the Affordable Care Act," American Journal of Health Economics, MIT Press, vol. 3(3), pages 346-369, Summer.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Martin Gaynor & Kate Ho & Robert J. Town, 2015. "The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(2), pages 235-284, June.
    2. Determann, Domino & Lambooij, Mattijs S. & de Bekker-Grob, Esther W. & Hayen, Arthur P. & Varkevisser, Marco & Schut, Frederik T. & Wit, G. Ardine de, 2016. "What health plans do people prefer? The trade-off between premium and provider choice," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 10-18.
    3. Timothy J. Layton & Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 2015. "Assessing Incentives for Adverse Selection in Health Plan Payment Systems," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2015-024, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    4. Nathaniel Hendren & Camille Landais & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2021. "Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 457-486, August.
    5. Johannes Spinnewijn, 2017. "Heterogeneity, Demand for Insurance, and Adverse Selection," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 308-343, February.
    6. Jonathan D. Ketcham & Nicolai V. Kuminoff & Christopher A. Powers, 2016. "Estimating the Heterogeneous Welfare Effects of Choice Architecture: An Application to the Medicare Prescription Drug Insurance Market," NBER Working Papers 22732, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Tomas Pedro Sanguinetti, 2019. "How Do Couples Choose Individual Insurance Plans? Evidence from Medicare Part D," 2019 Papers psa1760, Job Market Papers.
    8. Keith Marzilli Ericson & Philipp Kircher & Johannes Spinnewijn & Amanda Starc, 2021. "Inferring Risk Perceptions and Preferences Using Choice from Insurance Menus: Theory and Evidence," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(634), pages 713-744.
    9. Benjamin L. Collier & Marc A. Ragin, 2020. "The Influence of Sellers on Contract Choice: Evidence from Flood Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 87(2), pages 523-557, June.
    10. Kaufmann, Cornel & Müller, Tobias & Hefti, Andreas & Boes, Stefan, 2018. "Does personalized information improve health plan choices when individuals are distracted?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 197-214.
    11. Johannes G. Jaspersen & Marc A. Ragin & Justin R. Sydnor, 2019. "Predicting Insurance Demand from Risk Attitudes," NBER Working Papers 26508, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Florian Heiss & Daniel McFadden & Joachim Winter & Amelie Wuppermann & Bo Zhou, 2016. "Inattention and Switching Costs as Sources of Inertia in Medicare Part D," NBER Working Papers 22765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. M. Kate Bundorf & Maria Polyakova & Ming Tai-Seale, 2019. "How do Humans Interact with Algorithms? Experimental Evidence from Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 25976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, 2023. "Health insurance menu design for large employers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(4), pages 598-637, December.
    15. Nathan Kettlewell, 2020. "Policy Choice and Product Bundling in a Complicated Health Insurance Market: Do People Get It Right?," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 55(2), pages 566-610.
    16. Jason Abaluck & Abi Adams, 2017. "What Do Consumers Consider Before They Choose? Identification from Asymmetric Demand Responses," NBER Working Papers 23566, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Olivier Darmouni & Dan Zeltzer, 2022. "Horizon effects and adverse selection in health insurance markets," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(2), pages 800-827, May.
    18. Jason Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, 2016. "Improving the Quality of Choices in Health Insurance Markets," NBER Working Papers 22917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Jason Abaluck & Abi Adams, 2017. "What do consumers consider before they choose? Identification from asymmetric demand responses," IFS Working Papers W17/09, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    20. Caceres, Daniela & Valdivia, Melissa & Barron, Manuel, 2024. "Information on Cancer Prevalence and Oncologic Insurance Take-up," MPRA Paper 120274, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21565. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.