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The Role of Government Reimbursement in Drug Shortages

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  • Ali Yurukoglu
  • Eli Liebman
  • David B. Ridley

Abstract

Beginning in the mid-2000s, the incidence of drug shortages rose, especially for generic injectable drugs such as anesthetics and chemotherapy treatments. We examine whether reimbursement changes contributed to the shortages, focusing on a reduction in Medicare Part B reimbursement to providers for drugs. We hypothesize that lower reimbursement put downward pressure on manufacturers’ prices which reduced manufacturers’ incentives to invest in capacity, reliability, and new launches. We show that, after the policy change, shortages rose more for drugs with (i) higher shares of patients insured by Medicare, (ii) greater decreases in provider reimbursement, and (iii) greater decreases in manufacturer prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Ali Yurukoglu & Eli Liebman & David B. Ridley, 2012. "The Role of Government Reimbursement in Drug Shortages," NBER Working Papers 17987, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17987
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Dana, James D, Jr, 2001. "Competition in Price and Availability When Availability is Unobservable," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 497-513, Autumn.
    6. Amy Finkelstein, 2004. "Static and Dynamic Effects of Health Policy: Evidence from the Vaccine Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 527-564.
    7. Gregory S. Crawford & Ali Yurukoglu, 2012. "The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 643-685, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb, 2017. "In the Shadow of a Giant: Medicare’s Influence on Private Physician Payments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(1), pages 1-39.
    2. Lee, Chung-Ying, 2020. "Pricing strategy and moral hazard: Copay coupons in pharmaceuticals," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    3. Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb, 2014. "Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect Medical Treatment and Patient Health?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(4), pages 1320-1349, April.
    4. Geruso, Michael & Richards, Michael R., 2022. "Trading spaces: Medicare's regulatory spillovers on treatment setting for non-Medicare patients," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    5. David B. Ridley & Chung-Ying Lee, 2020. "Does Medicare Reimbursement Drive Up Drug Launch Prices?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(5), pages 980-993, December.
    6. Liebman, Eli & Lawler, Emily C. & Dunn, Abe & Ridley, David B., 2023. "Consequences of a shortage and rationing: Evidence from a pediatric vaccine," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    7. Alpert, Abby & Duggan, Mark & Hellerstein, Judith K., 2013. "Perverse reverse price competition: Average wholesale prices and Medicaid pharmaceutical spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 44-62.
    8. Ernst R. Berndt & Rena M. Conti & Stephen J. Murphy, 2017. "The Landscape of US Generic Prescription Drug Markets, 2004-2016," NBER Working Papers 23640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Dubois, P.; & Majewska, G.; & Reig, V.;, 2023. "Drug Shortages: Empirical Evidence from France," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 23/07, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
    10. Andy Ye Yuan & Bernard Black & Timea Viragh & David J. Magid & Qian Luo & Ali Moghtaderi, 2023. "Effect of financial incentives on hospital‐cardiologist integration and cardiac test location," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(3), pages 570-608, September.
    11. Kortelainen, Mika & Markkanen, Jaakko & Toivanen, Otto & Siikanen, Markku, 2023. "The Effects of Price Regulation on Pharmaceutical Expenditure and Availability," CEPR Discussion Papers 18497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Dubois, Pierre & Majewska, Gosia & Reig, Valentina, 2023. "Drug Shortages: Empirical Evidence from France," TSE Working Papers 23-1417, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    13. Casey B. Mulligan & Kevin K. Tsui, 2016. "The Upside-down Economics of Regulated and Otherwise Rigid Prices," NBER Working Papers 22305, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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