The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job Tenure, Quits
This paper examines the effect of trade unionism on the exit behavior of workers in the context of Hirschman's exit-voice dichotomy. Unionism is expected to reduce quits and permanent separations and raise job tenure by providing a "voice" alternative to exit when workers are dissatisfied with conditions. Empirical evidence supports this contention, showing significantly lower exit for unionists in several large data tapes. It is argued that the grievance system plays a major role in the reduction in exit and that the reduction lowers cost and raises productivity.
|Date of creation:||Nov 1980|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Freeman, Richard B. "The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job Tenure, Quits, and Separations." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol XCIV, No. 4, (June 1980), pp. 643- 673.|
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- Freeman, Richard B, 1976. "Individual Mobility and Union Voice in the Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 361-68, May.
- Kahn, Lawrence M, 1977. "Union Impact: A Reduced Form Approach," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 59(4), pages 503-07, November.
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