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Efectos de la reducción de la jornada laboral en un modelo con dos sectores

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En tiempos de crisis económicas, con altas tasas de paro, no debemos desconsiderar ninguna política susceptible de crear empleo. La reducción de la jornada laboral es una de ellas. La aplicación de cualquier política puede tener consecuencias distintas si se aplica en contextos diferentes. En este trabajo se estudian los efectos de la aplicación de una política de reducción de la jornada laboral en un modelo de equilibrio general con heterogeneidad en la parte de las empresas: se divide la economía en dos sectores. Las claves del modelo son la existencia de distintas productividades en las horas de trabajo para cada sector y la existencia de costes de ajuste o tiempo que dedica cada trabajador a adaptarse al puesto de trabajo al principio de la jornada. Para ello se ha construido un modelo de equilibrio general con función de emparejamiento, en el que la población se divide en dos grupos: los activos (entre los que se diferencia a los parados de los ocupados) y los inactivos. Ante la nueva jornada más reducida parte de los trabajadores inactivos deciden incorporarse a la tasa de activos. Los resultados muestran que la reducción de la jornada laboral tiene efectos más positivos sobre el empleo si se aplica en sectores con productividad más baja y con menores costes de ajuste. Los nuevos trabajadores que se incorporan a las jornadas más cortas son más productivos ya que no tienen el efecto “cansancio acumulado” y siempre y cuando el tiempo dedicado a adaptarse al puesto de trabajo no sea muy alto, las horas de trabajo de estos nuevos trabajadores serán más productivas que las últimas de las jornadas más largas.

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Paper provided by Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra in its series Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra with number 1203.

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Date of creation: 2012
Publication status: Published in
Handle: RePEc:nav:ecupna:1203
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  1. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 616-636, June.
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  8. Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Cream-skimming, incentives for efficiency and payment system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 419-443, May.
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