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Delegation in the family

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Marie Baland

    (Development Finance and Public Policies, University of Namur)

  • Marie Boltz

    (BETA, University of Strasbourg)

  • Catherine Guirkinger

    (Development Finance and Public Policies, University of Namur)

  • Anna Jolivet

    (Development Finance and Public Policies, University of Namur)

  • Roberta Ziparo

    (AMSE, Aix-Marseille University)

Abstract

Non-participation in household decisions is commonly interpreted as weak empowerment. We challenge this interpretation by showing that non-participation can be a strategic choice — a form of delegation — when a spouse expects the decision outcome to be sufficiently close to her preferences regardless of her involvement. We propose a model of imperfect information and derive conditions under which delegation arises in equilibrium: it occurs when the opportunity cost of participation in the decision is large compared to the preference gap between spouses. A key implication is that the spouse who receives authority may achieve lower welfare than the one who delegates. We test these predictions in two incentivized experiments conducted among couples in Belgium/France and Benin, finding strong support across both contexts. Survey evidence further confirms the external validity of the results. Our findings suggest that standard survey measures of intra-household bargaining, by conflating strategic delegation with disempowerment, may incorrectly reflect the distribution of power within households.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Marie Baland & Marie Boltz & Catherine Guirkinger & Anna Jolivet & Roberta Ziparo, 2026. "Delegation in the family," DeFiPP Working Papers 2605, University of Namur, Development Finance and Public Policies.
    • Handle: RePEc:nam:defipp:2605
    as

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    File URL: https://defipp.unamur.be/wp/defipp_wp_2026_5.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nina Buchmann & Pascaline Dupas & Roberta Ziparo, 2025. "The Good Wife? Reputation Dynamics and Financial Decision-Making inside the Household," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 115(2), pages 525-570, February.
    2. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 2010. "Distributional Effects in Household Models: Separate Spheres and Income Pooling," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(545), pages 786-799, June.
    3. Baland, Jean-Marie & Bequet, Ludovic & Guirkinger, Catherine & Manuel, Clarice, 2024. "Sharing norm, household efficiency and female demand for agency in the Philippines," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 174(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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