Duality and optimal strategies in the finitely repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides
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- Bernard De Meyer & Alexandre Marino, 2005. "Duality and optimal strategies in the finitely repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00193996, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Bernard De Meyer, 1996. "Repeated Games, Duality and the Central Limit Theorem," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 21(1), pages 237-251, February.
- DE MEYER , Bernard, 1993. "Repeated Games and the Central Limit Theorem," CORE Discussion Papers 1993003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Mertens,Jean-FranÃ§ois & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015.
Cambridge University Press, number 9781107662636.
- Bernard De Meyer & Alexandre Marino, 2004. "Repeated market games with lack of information on both sides," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla04066, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Bernard De Meyer, 1996. "Repeated games, Duality, and the Central Limit Theorem," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00259714, HAL.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvain, 2015. "Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00390625 is not listed on IDEAS
- De Meyer, Bernard, 2010.
"Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 42-71, May.
- Bernard De Meyer, 2007. "Price Dynamics on a Stock Market with Asymmetric Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1604, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bernard De Meyer, 2007. "Price Dynamics on a Stock Market with Asymmetric Information," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000841, UCLA Department of Economics.
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KeywordsRepeated games; dual games; incomplete information; recurrence formula;
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