Duality and optimal strategies in the finitely repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides
The recursive formula for the value of the zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on both sides is known for a long time. As it is explained in the paper, the usual proof of this formula is in a sense non constructive : it just claims that the players are unable to guarantee a better payoff than the one prescribed by formula, but it does not indicates how the players can guarantee this amount. In this paper we aim to give a constructive approach to this formula using duality techniques. This will allow us to recursively describe the optimal strategies in those games and to apply these results to games with infinite action spaces.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2005|
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- Bernard De Meyer, 1996. "Repeated games, Duality, and the Central Limit Theorem," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00259714, HAL.
- DE MEYER , Bernard, 1993. "Repeated Games and the Central Limit Theorem," CORE Discussion Papers 1993003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- repec:hal:journl:hal-00259714 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bernard De Meyer & Alexandre Marino, 2004. "Repeated market games with lack of information on both sides," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla04066, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
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