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Essai d'une théorie générale de la firme


  • Adama Zerbo

    (GED, Université de Bordeaux)


La science économique offre une vision éclatée de la firme : (i) la firme « maximisatrice » du profit de l’employeur, (ii) la firme des relations contractuelles et (iii) la firme comme un « nœud de compétences ». De ce fait, l’analyse de la firme dans sa globalité et surtout l’analyse des interactions entre ses différents aspects restent confrontées à l’absence d’une théorie complète. Pour ce faire, ce travail s’est fixé pour objectif de proposer une théorie générale de la firme. Il s’est fondé sur des hypothèses réalistes qui concourent à soutenir l’idée selon laquelle « outre la satisfaction de l’employeur qui est principalement liée au profit, la satisfaction des autres parties prenantes notamment les travailleurs constitue également une préoccupation de la firme ». Ainsi, dans son comportement d’ensemble, la firme cherche à atteindre une situation de compromis qui assure le niveau de satisfaction subjective le plus élevé possible à toutes les parties prenantes, au regard de ses capacités de production et de développement de nouvelles compétences, ainsi que de son environnement juridique, institutionnel, informationnel et économique interne et externe. L’analyse de ce nouveau cadre théorique a permis de dégager plusieurs résultats théoriques qui montrent notamment que : (i) le point de compromis de la firme se caractérise par l’égalité entre les utilités marginales des niveaux respectifs de rémunérations/gains des parties prenantes ; (ii) la demande de travail de la firme est composite (force de travail, compétences) et est fonction du profit réel, du salaire réel et du niveau réel de production ; (iii) toute chose égale par ailleurs, le modèle néoclassique de maximisation du profit sous-estime la demande de travail des firmes et ainsi de l’économie, et surestime le niveau de profit de la firmes. Economics provides an exploded view of the firm: (i) employer’s profit-maximizing firm, (ii) contractual relationships firm and (iii) "competences nexus” firm. Therefore, the analysis of the firm as a whole and the interactions between its various aspects is still facing the lack of a complete theory. So, this work aims to propose a general theory of the firm. It is based on realistic assumptions which contribute to support the idea that "in addition to the satisfaction of the employer that is primarily related to profit, satisfaction of other stakeholders including workers is also a concern to the firm". Thus, in its overall behavior, the firm seeks to reach a compromise position ensuring the level of subjective satisfaction as high as possible to all stakeholders, considering its production and new skills development capacities, as well as its internal and external legal, institutional, informational and economic environment. The analysis of this new theoretical framework led to several theoretical results showing in particular that: (i) the compromise point of the firm is characterized by the equality between marginal utilities of the respective levels of stakeholders earnings ; (ii) the labor demand of the firm is composite (labor force, skills) and depends on actual profits, real wages and real production levels; (iii) all things being equal, the neoclassical model of profit maximization underestimates labor demand of firms and thus of the economy, and overestimates the level of profit of the firm.(Full text in french)

Suggested Citation

  • Adama Zerbo, 2016. "Essai d'une théorie générale de la firme," Documents de travail 175, Groupe d'Economie du Développement de l'Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV.
  • Handle: RePEc:mon:ceddtr:175

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-261, October.
    2. Benjamin Coriat & Olivier Weinstein, 2010. "Les théories de la firme entre « contrats » et « compétences ». Une revue critique des développements contemporains," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 57-86.
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    Cited by:

    1. Adama Zerbo, 2018. "A Theorem for Okun's Law," Documents de travail 180, Groupe d'Economie du Développement de l'Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV.
    2. Adama Zerbo, 2018. "Evidences empiriques sur la formation de l'équilibre du marché du travail : cas des pays de l'OCDE," Documents de travail 179, Groupe d'Economie du Développement de l'Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV.
    3. Adama Zerbo, 2018. "Essai d'une nouvelle représentation macroéconomique du marché du travail," Documents de travail 178, Groupe d'Economie du Développement de l'Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV.
    4. Adama Zerbo, 2018. "La demande de travail de la théorie générale de la firme : évidences empiriques," Documents de travail 177, Groupe d'Economie du Développement de l'Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV.
    5. Adama Zerbo, 2017. "Croissance économique et chômage : les fondements de la loi d'Okun et le modèle IS-LM-LO," Documents de travail 176, Groupe d'Economie du Développement de l'Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV.

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    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory

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