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Trade policy: home market effect versus terms of trade externality

Author

Listed:
  • Alessia Campolmi

    (Central European University and Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Hungary)

  • Harald Fadinger

    (University of Vienna, Austria)

  • Chiara Forlati

    (École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland)

Abstract

We study trade policy in a two-sector Krugman-type trade model with home market effects. We conduct a general analysis allowing for three different instruments: tariffs, export taxes and production subsidies. For each instrument, we consider unilateral trade policy without retaliation. When carefully disentangling the different effects that determine policy makers’ choices and modeling general equilibrium effects of taxes/tariffs, we find – contrary to the results of previous studies – that production subsidies are always inefficiently low and driven by the incentives to improve the (welfare relevant) terms of trade. In the cases of tariffs and export taxes results depend crucially on whether the free trade allocation is efficient. When starting from an allocation that is distorted because of monopolistic competition, the home market effect (and in the case of export taxes also the desire to correct for the monopolistic inefficiency) induces policy makers to set a tariff (an export subsidy). However, when monopolistic distortions are corrected, terms of trade effects dominate the choice of trade policy and lead to an import subsidy (an export tax).

Suggested Citation

  • Alessia Campolmi & Harald Fadinger & Chiara Forlati, 2010. "Trade policy: home market effect versus terms of trade externality," MNB Working Papers 2010/6, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary).
    • Handle: RePEc:mnb:wpaper:2010/6
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    Cited by:

    1. Bagwell, Kyle & Lee, Seung Hoon, 2020. "Trade policy under monopolistic competition with firm selection," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    2. Paul R. Bergin & Giancarlo Corsetti, 2020. "Beyond Competitive Devaluations: The Monetary Dimensions of Comparative Advantage," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 246-286, October.
    3. David De Remer, 2013. "The Evolution of International Subsidy Rules," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2013-45, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Antonella Nocco & Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano & Matteo Salto & Atsushi Tadokoro, 2024. "Leaving the global playing field through optimal non-discriminatory corporate taxes and subsidies," CEP Discussion Papers dp1992, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    5. Takatsuka, Hajime & Zeng, Dao-Zhi, 2016. "Nontariff protection without an outside good," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 65-78.
    6. Stéphane Auray & Devereux Michael B. & Aurélien Eyquem, 2020. "Trade Wars, Currency Wars," Post-Print halshs-03031865, HAL.
    7. Arnaud Costinot & Andrés Rodríguez‐Clare & Iván Werning, 2020. "Micro to Macro: Optimal Trade Policy With Firm Heterogeneity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2739-2776, November.
    8. Kohl, Miriam & Richter, Philipp M., 2023. "Unilateral tax policy in the open economy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    9. Alessia Campolmi & Harald Fadinger & Chiara Forlati, 2025. "Trade and Domestic Policies under Monopolistic Competition," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 135(667), pages 892-913.
    10. Luca Macedoni & Ariel Weinberger, 2025. "International Spillovers Of Quality Regulations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 66(1), pages 453-484, February.
    11. Nocco, Antonella & Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. & Salto, Matteo, 2019. "Geography, competition, and optimal multilateral trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 145-161.
    12. Paul R. Bergin & Giancarlo Corsetti, 2013. "International Competitiveness and Monetary Policy: Strategic Policy and Coordination with a Production Relocation Externality," NBER Working Papers 19356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Allan Sørensen, 2022. "Spillovers from foreign business conditions," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 158(3), pages 779-814, August.
    14. Bartelme, Dominick & Lan, Ting & Levchenko, Andrei A., 2024. "Specialization, market access and real income," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    15. Haaland, Jan I. & Venables, Anthony J., 2016. "Optimal trade policy with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 85-95.
    16. Epifani, Paolo & Gancia, Gino, 2017. "Global imbalances revisited: The transfer problem and transport costs in monopolistic competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 99-116.
    17. David R. DeRemer, 2016. "The Principle of Reciprocity in the 21st Century," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1613, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    18. Pol Antràs & Teresa C. Fort & Agustín Gutiérrez & Felix Tintelnot, 2022. "Trade Policy and Global Sourcing: An Efficiency Rationale for Tariff Escalation," NBER Working Papers 30225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Gene M. Grossman & Phillip McCalman & Robert W. Staiger, 2021. "The “New” Economics of Trade Agreements: From Trade Liberalization to Regulatory Convergence?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(1), pages 215-249, January.
    20. Stéphane Auray & Michael B. Devereux & Aurélien Eyquem, 2024. "The Demand for Trade Protection over the Business Cycle," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(4), pages 865-898, June.
    21. Vincent Rebeyrol, 2023. "Protection Without Discrimination," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(655), pages 2807-2827.
    22. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "The Design of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 22087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Luca Macedoni & Ariel Weinberger, 2021. "Quality Misallocation, Trade, and Regulations," CESifo Working Paper Series 9041, CESifo.
    24. Ma. Joy V. Abrenica & Anthony G. Sabarillo, 2024. "How might China-US industrial policies affect the Philippines?: a quantitative exercise," Philippine Review of Economics, University of the Philippines School of Economics and Philippine Economic Society, vol. 61(2), pages 171-198, December.
    25. David De Remer, 2013. "Domestic Policy Coordination in Imperfectly Competitive Markets," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2013-46, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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