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Trade policy: home market effect versus terms of trade externality

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Alessia Campolmi

    ()

    (Central European University and Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Hungary)

  • Harald Fadinger

    ()

    (University of Vienna, Austria)

  • Chiara Forlati

    ()

    (École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland)

Abstract

We study trade policy in a two-sector Krugman-type trade model with home market effects. We conduct a general analysis allowing for three different instruments: tariffs, export taxes and production subsidies. For each instrument, we consider unilateral trade policy without retaliation. When carefully disentangling the different effects that determine policy makers’ choices and modeling general equilibrium effects of taxes/tariffs, we find – contrary to the results of previous studies – that production subsidies are always inefficiently low and driven by the incentives to improve the (welfare relevant) terms of trade. In the cases of tariffs and export taxes results depend crucially on whether the free trade allocation is efficient. When starting from an allocation that is distorted because of monopolistic competition, the home market effect (and in the case of export taxes also the desire to correct for the monopolistic inefficiency) induces policy makers to set a tariff (an export subsidy). However, when monopolistic distortions are corrected, terms of trade effects dominate the choice of trade policy and lead to an import subsidy (an export tax).

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File URL: http://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/wp-2010-6-final.pdf
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Paper provided by Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary) in its series MNB Working Papers with number 2010/6.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Handle: RePEc:mnb:wpaper:2010/6
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.mnb.hu/

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Keywords: home market effect; terms of trade; tariffs and subsidies;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
  • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
  • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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  1. Chari, V.V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 1999. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 26, pages 1671-1745 Elsevier.
  2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August.
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  6. Harry G. Johnson, 1953. "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 142-153.
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  9. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
  10. Gros, Daniel, 1987. "A note on the optimal tariff, retaliation and the welfare loss from tariff wars in a framework with intra-industry trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 357-367, November.
  11. Lucas, Robert Jr. & Stokey, Nancy L., 1983. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 55-93.
  12. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
  13. Flam, Harry & Helpman, Elhanan, 1987. "Industrial policy under monopolistic competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1-2), pages 79-102, February.
  14. Venables, Anthony J, 1987. "Trade and Trade Policy with Differentiated Products: A Chamberlinian-Ricardian Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 700-717, September.
  15. Ralph Ossa, 2011. "A "New Trade" Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(1), pages 122-152.
  16. Dixit, Avinash, 1985. "Tax policy in open economies," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 313-374 Elsevier.
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Cited by:

  1. Haaland, Jan I. & Venables, Anthony J., 2016. "Optimal trade policy with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 85-95.
  2. Paul Bergin & Giancarlo Corsetti, 2015. "Beyond Competitive Devaluations: The Monetary Dimensions of Comparative Advantage," Discussion Papers 1516, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
  3. David De Remer, 2013. "The Evolution of International Subsidy Rules," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2013-45, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  4. Takatsuka, Hajime & Zeng, Dao-Zhi, 2016. "Nontariff protection without an outside good," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 65-78.
  5. Arnaud Costinot & Andrés Rodríguez-Clare & Iván Werning, 2016. "Micro to Macro: Optimal Trade Policy with Firm Heterogeneity," NBER Working Papers 21989, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Paolo Epifani & Gino Gancia, 2015. "Global imbalances revisited: The transfer problem and transport costs in monopolistic competition," Economics Working Papers 1503, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 2017.
  7. Paul R. Bergin & Giancarlo Corsetti, 2013. "International Competitiveness and Monetary Policy: Strategic Policy and Coordination with a Production Relocation Externality," NBER Working Papers 19356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "The Design of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 22087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. David De Remer, 2013. "Domestic Policy Coordination in Imperfectly Competitive Markets," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2013-46, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  10. David R. DeRemer, 2016. "The Principle of Reciprocity in the 21st Century," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1613, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

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