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Protection Without Discrimination

Author

Listed:
  • Vincent Rebeyrol

Abstract

This paper shows that non-tariff measures may fully respect the non-discrimination principle of the World Trade Organisation and still act as a protectionist device. Non-tariff measures that raise costs of all firms induce some exit, reallocating market shares towards the most efficient firms. The paper analyses when this mechanism generates protectionism. With political economy motives, trade liberalisation increases the use of non-tariff measures in the non-cooperative equilibrium and a trade agreement may be welfare reducing if governments care about the most efficient firms only. Moreover, a Pareto improving agreement may require an income redistribution between countries if firm average productivity differs across countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent Rebeyrol, 2023. "Protection Without Discrimination," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(655), pages 2807-2827.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:133:y:2023:i:655:p:2807-2827.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ej/uead046
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    Cited by:

    1. Luca Macedoni & Ariel Weinberger, 2025. "International Spillovers Of Quality Regulations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 66(1), pages 453-484, February.
    2. David De Remer, 2013. "Domestic Policy Coordination in Imperfectly Competitive Markets," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2013-46, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. Yuan Mei, 2024. "Regulatory Protection And The Role Of International Cooperation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 65(2), pages 817-850, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration

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