Non-monotone Incentives in a Model of Coexisting Hidden Action and Hidden Information
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References listed on IDEAS
- Melumad, Nahum D. & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1989. "Value of communication in agencies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 334-368, April.
- Suren Basov & Peter Bardsley, 2005. "A General Model of Coexisting Hidden Action and Hidden Information," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 958, The University of Melbourne.
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Keywordshidden action; hidden information; Fredholmintegral equations of the first type; Hermit polynomials.;
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-14 (All new papers)
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