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Can Tight and Centralized Financial Regulation Prevent Financial Crises? Czech Government Bond Seignorage in the Historical Perspective

Author

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  • Tomas Otahal

    () (Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, Mendel University in Brno)

  • Vaclav Rybacek

    () (University of Economics, Prague)

Abstract

Can tight and centralized financial regulation prevent financial crises? Governments usually respond to financial crises with tightening and centralizing financial regulation. In this paper, we explore the historical parallels between the governmental responses to the financial crises at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century in the USA and the recent response of the European Union. Our rent- seeking model with endogenous rent derived from the historical narrative predicts that tight and centralized financial regulation might increase the risk of inflationary monetary policy. To illustrate our findings on an empirical example, we calculated the Czech government bond seignorage that represents the rent extracted through inflationary monetary policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomas Otahal & Vaclav Rybacek, 2011. "Can Tight and Centralized Financial Regulation Prevent Financial Crises? Czech Government Bond Seignorage in the Historical Perspective," MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics 2011-14, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:men:wpaper:14_2011
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. "Corruption and Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 97-125, October.
    2. Toma, Mark, 1982. "Inflationary bias of the Federal Reserve System : A bureaucratic perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 163-190.
    3. Tomas Otahal, 2011. "Rent-Seeking Origins of Central Banks: The Case of the Federal Reserve System," MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics 2011-08, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    4. Rockoff, Hugh, 1972. "American Free Banking Before the Civil War: a Re-Examination," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(01), pages 417-420, March.
    5. James Forder, 2003. "'Independence' and the founding of the Federal Reserve," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 50(3), pages 297-310, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bureaucracy; corruption; economic efficiency; Chicago Public Choice; Virginia Public Choice; rent-seeking; rule of law;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N11 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N21 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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