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Pro-social Behavior in the Global Commons: A North-South Experiment

Author

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  • Juan Camilo Cardenas
  • Jeffrey Carpenter

Abstract

Differences in group affiliation may affect the level of cooperation in global commons situations such as programs for the conservation of resources which generate benefits that transcend state boundaries. We design a real-time, cross-cultural common pool resource (CPR) experiment purposely using participants from cultures that derive different benefits from biodiversity (extraction versus conservation) to analyze the effect of group affiliation on cooperative behavior. In addition, we elicit real donations to local and international conservation funds to augment our CPR results. In the CPR environment, we find evidence that group affiliation affects hehavior such that heterogeneity contributes to over-extraction in the commons. In the donation stage, we show that nationality affects the distribution of donated earnings between the local and global funds. We also examine the possibility that altruistic preferences to donate to a conservation fund are endogenous, in that they reflect the level of cooperation in the CPR game.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Camilo Cardenas & Jeffrey Carpenter, 2003. "Pro-social Behavior in the Global Commons: A North-South Experiment," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 03-29, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:03-29
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    File URL: http://www.middlebury.edu/services/econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/0329.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development

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