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Monotonicity and Bounds for Cost Shares under the Path Serial Rule

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  • Truchon, Michel
  • Téjédo, Cyril

Abstract

We pursue the analysis of the Path Serial Cost Sharing Rule by examining how the cost share of an agent varies with respect to its own demand and the one of other agents. We also provide bounds for cost shares under an appropriate assumption on the cost function. On poursuit l'analyse de la règle séquentielle avec sentiers (Path Serial Rule) pour le partage des coûts. On étudie la variation de la part du coût d'un agent par rapport à sa demande et celles des autres agents. On montre également que, avec une hypothèse appropriée sur la fonction de coût, les contributions exigées des agents avec cette règle se situent à l'intérieur de bornes raisonnables.

Suggested Citation

  • Truchon, Michel & Téjédo, Cyril, 2002. "Monotonicity and Bounds for Cost Shares under the Path Serial Rule," Cahiers de recherche 0203, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  • Handle: RePEc:lvl:laeccr:0203
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    File URL: http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/w3/recherche/cahiers/2002/0203.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sprumont, Yves, 1998. "Ordinal Cost Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 126-162, July.
    2. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-1037, September.
    3. Koster, Maurice & Tijs, Stef & Borm, Peter, 1998. "Serial cost sharing methods for multi-commodity situations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 229-242, December.
    4. Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-977, December.
    5. Marcel Boyer & Michel Moreaux & Michel Truchon, 2003. "Partage des coûts et tarification des infrastructures - Le cas des réseaux municipaux souterrains," CIRANO Project Reports 2003rp-04, CIRANO.
    6. Moulin Herve & Shenker Scott, 1994. "Average Cost Pricing versus Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Comparison," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 178-201, October.
    7. Moulin, Herve, 1996. "Cost Sharing under Increasing Returns: A Comparison of Simple Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-251, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tejedo, Cyril & Truchon, Michel, 2002. "Serial cost sharing in multidimensional contexts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 277-299, December.
    2. Pene Kalulumia & Denis Bolduc, 2004. "Generalized Mixed Estimation Of A Multinomial Discretecontinuous Choice Model For Electricity Demand," Cahiers de recherche 04-01, Departement d'Economique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
    3. Cyril Téjédo & Michel Truchon, 2001. "Serial Cost Sharing in Multidimensional Contexts (May 2002 revised version)," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-68, CIRANO.
    4. Pene Kalulumia, 2002. "Effects of government debt on interest rates: evidence from causality tests in johansen-type models," Cahiers de recherche 02-07, Departement d'Economique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
    5. Maurice Koster, 2007. "The Moulin–Shenker rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 271-293, September.
    6. Petr Hanel, 2003. "Impact Of Government Support Programs On Innovation By Canadian Manufacturing Firms," Cahiers de recherche 04-02, Departement d'Economique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Serial cost sharing; multi products; monotonicity; bounds;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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