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Rule Changes and Competitive Balance in Formula One Motor Racing

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  • Mastromarco, Camilla
  • Runkel, Marco

Abstract

This paper provides an economic explanation of the frequent rule changes in the Formula One (F1) motor racing series. In a two-stage model, the FIA (as the organizer of the F1) first decides whether to change the rules or not, and then the racing teams compete in a contest. It turns out that a rule change reduces the teams' performances, but also improves competitive balance between the teams. The rule change is implemented, if the FIA's revenue gain from the latter effect overcompensates the FIA's revenue loss from the former effect. We provide empirical evidence from F1 seasons in the period 1950-2003 which supports the main implications of the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Mastromarco, Camilla & Runkel, Marco, 2004. "Rule Changes and Competitive Balance in Formula One Motor Racing," Discussion Papers in Economics 386, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:386
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    Cited by:

    1. Dominik Schreyer & Benno Torgler, 2018. "On the Role of Race Outcome Uncertainty in the TV Demand for Formula 1 Grands Prix," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 19(2), pages 211-229, February.
    2. Chris Judde & Ross Booth & Robert Brooks, 2013. "Second Place Is First of the Losers," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 14(4), pages 411-439, August.
    3. John Considine & Liam Gallagher, 2018. "Competitive balance in a quasi-double knockout tournament," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(18), pages 2048-2055, April.
    4. Kunz-Kaltenhäuser, Philipp, 2021. "Is the NFL's Pro Bowl broken? Considering the players' perspective," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 149, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    5. Onur Burak Celik, 2020. "Survival of Formula One Drivers," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1271-1281, July.
    6. Pedro Garcia-del-Barrio & J. James Reade, 2022. "Does certainty on the winner diminish the interest in sport competitions? The case of formula one," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 1059-1079, August.
    7. Oliver Budzinski & Arne Feddersen, 2020. "Measuring competitive balance in Formula One racing," Chapters, in: Plácido Rodríguez & Stefan Kesenne & Brad R. Humphreys (ed.), Outcome Uncertainty in Sporting Events, chapter 1, pages 5-26, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Langen, Martin & Krauskopf, Thomas, 2010. "The election of a world champion," CAWM Discussion Papers 39, University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP).
    9. Krauskopf, Thomas & Langen, Martin & Bünger, Björn, 2010. "The search for optimal competitive balance in formula one," CAWM Discussion Papers 38, University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP).
    10. D'ora Gr'eta Petr'oczy & L'aszl'o Csat'o, 2019. "Revenue allocation in Formula One: a pairwise comparison approach," Papers 1909.12931, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
    11. Kenneth Linna & Evan Moore & Rodney Paul & Andrew Weinbach, 2014. "The Effects of the Clock and Kickoff Rule Changes on Actual and Market-Based Expected Scoring in NCAA Football," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 2(2), pages 1-14, April.
    12. repec:beo:swcetp:23-12 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Karin Hoisl & Marc Gruber & Annamaria Conti, 2017. "R&D team diversity and performance in hypercompetitive environments," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(7), pages 1455-1477, July.
    14. Ryan A. Kent & Steven B. Caudill & Franklin G. Mixon, 2013. "Rules changes and competitive balance in European professional soccer: evidence from an event study approach," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(11), pages 1109-1112, July.
    15. Robert Ridlon & Jiwoong Shin, 2013. "Favoring the Winner or Loser in Repeated Contests," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(5), pages 768-785, September.
    16. Marco Sahm, 2022. "Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-6, March.
    17. Dejan Trifunović & Bojan Ristić, 2023. "The Impact Of The Horizontal Distribution Of Media Rights Revenues In Sports Leagues On Competitive Balance," Shaping Post-COVID World – Challenges for Economic Theory and Policy, in: Aleksandra Praščević & Miomir Jakšić & Mihail Arandarenko & Dejan Trifunović & Milutin Ješić (ed.),Shaping Post-COVID World – Challenges for Economic Theory and Policy, chapter 12, pages 263-285, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade.
    18. Marco Di Domizio & Mattia Palombini, 2011. "Competitività orizzontale e verticale nel ciclismo professionistico: alcune riflessioni sul circuito pro tour," Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, Centro di diritto e business dello Sport, vol. 6(3), pages 35-54, Febbraio.
    19. Mourao, Paulo Reis, 2018. "Surviving in the shadows—An economic and empirical discussion about the survival of the non-winning F1 drivers," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 54-68.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Formula One ; Competitive Balance ; Contest;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

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