The Effect of Bank Competition on the Bank's Incentive to Collateralize
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More about this item
KeywordsCollateralization; screening; incentives; bank competition;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2007-08-08 (Banking)
- NEP-COM-2007-08-08 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2007-08-08 (Law & Economics)
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