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Entlohnung und Regulierung unabhängiger Versicherungsvermittler

Listed author(s):
  • Richter, Andreas
  • Schiller, Jörg

Unabhängige Vermittler erbringen im Rahmen Ihrer Tätigkeiten wichtige Dienstleistungen für Versicherungsunternehmen und Versicherungsnehmer. Zum einen soll für Versicherungsnehmer in vielen Bereichen passender Versicherungsschutz besorgt werden (Produktauswahl). Darüber hinaus können Vermittler im Rahmen ihrer Beratung zum Teil wichtige risikorelevante Umstände von Versicherungsnehmern beobachten, die Versicherungsunternehmen zu Berechnung adäquater Prämien benötigen (Risikoklassifikation). Ziel des Beitrages ist es, die Auswirkungen unterschiedlicher Entlohnungssysteme für unabhängige Versicherungsvermittler auf zentrale Marktfunktio-nen zu untersuchen. Darüber hinaus soll eingehender analysiert werden, inwieweit die Neuregelungen zum Vermittlerrecht in Deutschland dazu geeignet sind, die Beratungsqualität bzw. Effizienz der Intermediation durch unabhängige Vermittler im Bereich komplexer Risiken zu erhöhen.

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Paper provided by University of Munich, Munich School of Management in its series Discussion Papers in Business Administration with number 7524.

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Date of creation: 18 Nov 2008
Handle: RePEc:lmu:msmdpa:7524
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  1. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
  2. J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, 2006. "The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 73(3), pages 359-396.
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