Fiscal Decentralisation and Regional Development in Transition Countries
This paper lays a foundation by reviewing the issues and the comparative dimensions of fiscal decentralisation in four subject countries - Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. It is divided into the following components. First, it briefly reviews the issues: the main points of the economic literature on the subject and the special challenges to the transition countries in bringing about subsidiarity or devolution. Second, it describes the institutional structures of sub-national government. Then it turns to a three-part review of statistics to compare the relative roles of central and sub-national governmental units in revenue and expenditures in both some EU countries and some transition countries. In Part IV of the paper revenue sources and sharing are examined. Part V examines central grants programs both for their overall roles and in terms of a special feature of the paper - the extent to which central government grants programs are regressive or progressive across a country's subnational units. Part VI then looks at the expenditure side and the extent to which functional programs are decentralised to local governments. The paper is concluded by considerations of the connections between the local public and private sector development, especially in terms of strengthening market agents in the transition.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: De Bériotstraat 34, B-3000 Leuven|
Phone: +32 (0) 16 / 32 6598
Fax: +32 (0) 16 / 32 6599
Web page: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/licos
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997.
"Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall.
- Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives," Working Papers 97042, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Richard A. Musgrave, 1997. "Devolution, Grants, and Fiscal Competition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 65-72, Fall.
- Inman, Robert P. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1992. "Fiscal federalism in Europe : Lessons from the United States experience," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 654-660, April.
- Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1997. "Rethinking Federalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 43-64, Fall.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lic:licosd:10701. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.