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Nash Reversion Revisited:Implications of Gain/Loss Asymmetry

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  • Tadashi SEKIGUCHI
  • Katsutoshi WAKAI

Abstract

Game theory proves the existence of a stronger punishment than the Nash reversion in the repeated games. Recent empirical findings in Oligopoly, however, suggest the implementation of the Nash reversion. In a standard repeated game setting, we propose a potential answer for this empirical puzzle by using a refined version of the discounted utility that exhibits gain/loss asymmetry, where players discount gains more than losses. Our main result is as follows: among gain/loss robust subgame perfect equilibria, the Nash reversion offers the strongest punishment. The robustness is based on the assumption that players are unsure about their own level of gain/loss asymmetry and choose only the strategies that are subgame perfect for any level of gain/loss asymmetry they can perceive as possible.

Suggested Citation

  • Tadashi SEKIGUCHI & Katsutoshi WAKAI, 2025. "Nash Reversion Revisited:Implications of Gain/Loss Asymmetry," Discussion papers e-24-009, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
  • Handle: RePEc:kue:epaper:e-24-009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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