Asymmetric forecasting and commitment policy in a robust control problem
This paper provides a piece of results regarding asymmetric forecasting and commitment monetary policy with a robust control algorithm. Previous studies provide no clarification of the connection between asymmetric preference and robust commitment policy. Three results emerge from general equilibrium modeling with asymmetric preference: (i) the condition for system stability implies an average inflation bias with respect to asymmetry (ii) the effect of asymmetry can be mitigated if policy makers relinquish a concern for robustness, and (iii) commitment policy may be superior to discretionary policy under widely used calibration sets, regardless of asymmetry.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.econ.kobe-u.ac.jp|
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