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The Equivalence of Emission Tax with Tax-Revenue Refund and Emission Intensity Regulation


  • Hiroaki Ino

    () (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University)

  • Toshihiro Matsumura

    () (Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo)


This study shows the equivalence of the emission intensity regulation with tradable emission permits and the combination of emission tax and refunding of the tax revenue to consumers. If firms are symmetric, the equivalence result holds even without tradable permits.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroaki Ino & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2019. "The Equivalence of Emission Tax with Tax-Revenue Refund and Emission Intensity Regulation," Discussion Paper Series 188, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
  • Handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:188

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Matsumura, Toshihiro & Yamagishi, Atsushi, 2017. "Long-run welfare effect of energy conservation regulation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 64-68.
    2. Nils-Henrik Mørch von der Fehr, 1993. "Tradable emission rights and strategic interaction," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(2), pages 129-151, April.
    3. Sajal Lahiri & Yoshiyasu Ono, 2007. "Relative Emission Standard versus Tax under Oligopoly: The Role of Free Entry," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 107-128, June.
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    More about this item


    carbon pricing; electrification; the second best;

    JEL classification:

    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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