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Who are the brokers of knowledge in regional systems of innovation? A multi-actor network analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Martina Kauffeld-Monz

    () (Institute for Urban Science and Structural Policy (IfS Berlin), Germany.)

  • Michael Fritsch

    () (Friedrich Schiller University Jena, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW-Berlin), and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany.)

Abstract

The discussion on regional innovation systems emphasizes the duality of local and global links. While the former enable effective knowledge exchange between regional actors, the latter are considered to provide regional systems with knowledge diverse to their knowledge base. Our empirical analysis of 18 German regional innovation networks highlights the importance of public research organizations for inter-regional knowledge exchange. The broker and gatekeeper function of public research organizations may be particularly important in lagging regions that typically suffer from a lack of large firms who often assume the role of "gatekeepers of knowledge".

Suggested Citation

  • Martina Kauffeld-Monz & Michael Fritsch, 2008. "Who are the brokers of knowledge in regional systems of innovation? A multi-actor network analysis," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-089, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-089
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carlo Gianelle, 2011. "Exploring the complex structure of labour mobility networks. Evidence from Veneto microdata," Working Papers 2011_13, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    2. Mafini Dosso & Antonio Vezzani, 2017. "Firm market valuation and intellectual property assets," JRC Working Papers on Corporate R&D and Innovation 2017-07, Joint Research Centre (Seville site).
    3. Margherita Russo & Annalisa Caloffi & Federica Rossi, 2015. "Evaluating the performance of innovation intermediaries: insights from the experience of Tuscany’s innovation poles," Center for the Analysis of Public Policies (CAPP) 0121, Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Dipartimento di Economia "Marco Biagi".
    4. Margherita Russo & Annalisa Caloffi & Federica Rossi & Riccardo Righi, 2016. "Designing performance-based incentives for innovation intermediaries: Evidence from regional innovation poles," Working Papers 34, Birkbeck Centre for Innovation Management Research, revised Nov 2016.
    5. Franz, Peter, 2010. "Knowledge Spillovers as a Central Element in Theories about Knowledge-Based Regional Development: Advancement in Theory and Obstacles for Empirical Research," IWH Discussion Papers 5/2010, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    6. Martina Fromhold-Eisebith & Claudia Werker, 2013. "Universities’ functions in knowledge transfer: a geographical perspective," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 51(3), pages 621-643, December.
    7. Annalisa Caloffi & Federica Rossi & Margherita Russo, 2014. "The roles of different intermediaries in innovation networks: A network-based approach," Department of Economics (DEMB) 0030, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Department of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    8. Julie Le Gallo & Anne Plunket, 2016. "Technological gatekeepers, regional inventor networks and inventive performance," Working Papers hal-01422916, HAL.
    9. Falk Strotebeck, 2014. "Running with the pack? The role of Universities of applied science in a German research network," Review of Regional Research: Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, Springer;Gesellschaft für Regionalforschung (GfR), vol. 34(2), pages 139-156, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regional systems of innovation; innovation networks; knowledge broker; gatekeeper;

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure

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