A Theory of Bayesian Decision Making
This paper presents a complete, choice-based, axiomatic Bayesian decision theory. It introduces a new choice set consisting of information-contingent plans for choosing actions and bets and subjective expected utility model with effect-dependent utility functions and action-dependent subjective probabilities which, in conjunction with the updating of the probabilities using Bayes' rule, gives rise to a unique prior and a set of action-dependent posterior probabilities representing the decision maker's prior and posterior beliefs.
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- Machina Mark J. & Schmeidler David, 1995.
"Bayes without Bernoulli: Simple Conditions for Probabilistically Sophisticated Choice,"
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- Hill, Brian, 2010. "An additively separable representation in the Savage framework," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 2044-2054, September.
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- Brian Hill, 2010. "An additively separable representation in the Savage framework," Post-Print hal-00521803, HAL.
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- Edi Karni, 2005. "Subjective Expected Utility Theory without States of the World," Economics Working Paper Archive 523, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Machina, Mark J & Schmeidler, David, 1992. "A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 745-780, July.
- Mark J. Machina & David Schmeidler, 1990. "A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability," Discussion Paper Serie A 306, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Machina,Mark & Schmeidler,David, 1991. "A more robust definition of subjective probability," Discussion Paper Serie A 365, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Karni, Edi & Schmeidler, David, 1993. "On the Uniqueness of Subjective Probabilities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 267-277, April.
- Karni, E. & Schmeidler, D., 1991. "On the Uniqueness of Subjective Probabilities," Papers 1-92, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Edi Karni, 2008. "On Optimal Insurance in the Presence of Moral Hazard*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 33(1), pages 1-18, June.
- Nau, Robert F, 1995. "Coherent Decision Analysis with Inseparable Probabilities and Utilities," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 71-91, January.
- Wakker, Peter, 1987. "Subjective probabilities for state dependent continuous utility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 289-298, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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