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Missing the Target: Does Increased Capacity of the Local Government Improve Beneficiary Selection?

Author

Listed:
  • Asri, Viola

    (Chr. Michelsen Institute)

  • Biswas, Kumar

    (University of Chicago)

  • Fehrler, Sebastian

    (University of Bremen)

  • Fischbacher, Urs

    (University of Konstanz)

  • Michaelowa, Katharina

    (University of Zurich)

  • Rabbani, Atonu

    (University of Dhaka)

Abstract

The implementation of social policies is often hampered by the fact that local decision-makers may be unwilling or unable to implement the policy as intended by the central government. In contrast to research that focuses on incentivizing and holding local decision makers accountable, we examine capacity constraints in the context of beneficiary selection. Using a large-scale randomized trial in Bangladesh, we find that training and data provision improved knowledge of selection criteria. However, evidence of better targeting was limited, except for easily observable indicators of vulnerability. Improvements in targeting were more pronounced in committees led by highly educated chairpersons.

Suggested Citation

  • Asri, Viola & Biswas, Kumar & Fehrler, Sebastian & Fischbacher, Urs & Michaelowa, Katharina & Rabbani, Atonu, 2024. "Missing the Target: Does Increased Capacity of the Local Government Improve Beneficiary Selection?," IZA Discussion Papers 17365, IZA Network @ LISER.
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17365
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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