IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/isu/genstf/202310041552400000.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Affirmative Action in India: Restricted Strategy Space, Complex Constraints, and Direct Mechanism Design

Author

Listed:
  • Aygün, Orhan
  • Turhan, Bertan

Abstract

Since the 1950s, India has instituted an intricate affirmative action program through a meticulously designed reservation system. This system incorporates vertical and horizontal reservations to address historically marginalized groups’ socioeconomic imbalances. Vertical reservations designate specific quotas of available positions for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and Economically Weaker Sections. Concurrently, horizontal reservations are employed within each vertical category to allocate positions for additional subgroups, such as women and individuals with disabilities. In educational admissions, the legal framework recommended that unfilled positions reserved for the OBC category revert to unreserved status. Moreover, we document that individuals from vertically reserved categories have more complicated preferences over institution-vertical category position pairs, even though authorities only elicit their preferences over institutions. To address these challenges, the present paper proposes a novel class of Generalized Lexicographic (GL) choice rules. This class is comprehensive, subsuming the most salient priority structures discussed in the extant matching literature. Utilizing the GL choice rules and the deferred acceptance mechanism, we present a robust framework that generates equitable and effective solutions for resource allocation problems in the Indian context.

Suggested Citation

  • Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2023. "Affirmative Action in India: Restricted Strategy Space, Complex Constraints, and Direct Mechanism Design," ISU General Staff Papers 202310041552400000, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:202310041552400000
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/bitstreams/dba2d706-ee62-4a4d-8b0d-827958a8a870/download
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alexander Westkamp, 2013. "An analysis of the German university admissions system," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 561-589, August.
    2. Fragiadakis, Daniel & Troyan, Peter, 2017. "Improving matching under hard distributional constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Federico Echenique & Teddy Mekonnen & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2024. "Diversity in Choice as Majorization," Papers 2407.17589, arXiv.org.
    2. Xinquan Hu & Jun Zhang, 2025. "Verifiable affirmative action in Chinese high school admissions," Papers 2504.04689, arXiv.org.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "How to De-reserve Reserves," ISU General Staff Papers 202103100800001123, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Parag A. Pathak & Alex Rees-Jones & Tayfun Sönmez, 2025. "Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 107(1), pages 1-13, January.
    3. Tayfun Sonmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2022. "Constitutional Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies in India," Papers 2203.01483, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    4. Avataneo, Michelle & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 536-548.
    5. Hafalir, Isa E. & Kojima, Fuhito & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2022. "Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    6. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Constitutional Implementation of Vertical and Horizontal Reservations in India: A Unified Mechanism for Civil Service Allocation and College Admissions," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 978, Boston College Department of Economics.
    7. Orhan Aygun & Bertan Turhan, 2020. "Designing Direct Matching Mechanism for India with Comprehensive Affirmative Action," Papers 2004.13264, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    8. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Affirmative Action with Overlapping Reserves," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 990, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 15 Jan 2020.
    9. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Can Economic Theory be Informative for the Judiciary? Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1026, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 23 Jun 2021.
    10. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2020. "Graduate admission with financial support," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 114-127.
    11. Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2018. "Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 81-117.
    12. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "How to De-reserve Reserves," ISU General Staff Papers 202104130700001123, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    13. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 977, Boston College Department of Economics.
    14. Itai Ashlagi & Amin Saberi & Ali Shameli, 2020. "Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 467-479, March.
    15. Kamada, Yuichiro & Kojima, Fuhito, 2017. "Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 107-142.
    16. Orhan Aygun & Bertan Turhan, 2023. "Matching with Generalized Sequential Reserves," Papers 2310.02660, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2025.
    17. Hafalir, Isa & Pan, Siqi & Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2025. "Optimal top-n policy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 34-48.
    18. Priyanka Shende, 2020. "Constrained Serial Rule on the Full Preference Domain," Papers 2011.01178, arXiv.org.
    19. Klijn, Flip & Pais, Joana & Vorsatz, Marc, 2019. "Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 147-163.
    20. Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 198-237.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:202310041552400000. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Curtis Balmer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deiasus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.