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Zu den offenen Fragen des Board Primacy Konzeptes in der oekonomischen Theorie der Corporate Governance

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  • Franck Egon

    () (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)

Abstract

Der oekonomische Maistream propagiert die Shareholder Primacy in der Corporate Governance. Folgt man jedoch der inneroekonomisch vorgebrachten Kritik, laesst sich die Vorstellung einer Shareholder Primacy nachvollziehbar und so lange aufweichen, bis der uebrig gebliebene Rest ganz im Einklang zu der institutionellen Realitaet der Board Primacy in der Corporate Governance steht. Allerdings gelangt man zu einem unterbestimmten Board Primacy Konzept, in dem mehr darueber ausgesagt wird, was Board Primacy "nicht ist", als was sie "ist". Der Beitrag behandelt vor allem drei Fragen: Warum fuehrt die gaengige oekonomische Betrachtung zu einem unterbestimmten Board Primacy Konzept? Laesst bzw. wie laesst sich das beheben? Was folgt daraus fuer die oekonomische Theorie der Corporate Governance?

Suggested Citation

  • Franck Egon, 2012. "Zu den offenen Fragen des Board Primacy Konzeptes in der oekonomischen Theorie der Corporate Governance," Working Papers 0155, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
  • Handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0155
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    File URL: http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/iso/ISU_WPS/155_ISU_full.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    8. Franck Egon, 2011. "Ist es an der Zeit, die Aktionärsrechte zu stärken?," Working Papers 0156, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate Governance; Shareholder Primacy; Board Primacy; Treuhandpflichten; Business Judgement Rule; Fiduciary Duties;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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