IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iso/wpaper/0156.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Ist es an der Zeit, die Aktionärsrechte zu stärken?

Author

Listed:
  • Franck Egon

    (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)

Abstract

Forderungen nach mehr Aktionärsdemokratie finden zunehmende gesellschaftliche und auch akademische Akzeptanz. Der Beitrag erläutert, weswegen sie dennoch falsch sind, und empfiehlt eine Rückbesinnung auf die Kernelemente der Board Primacy im Falle anstehender Aktienrechtsrevisionen.

Suggested Citation

  • Franck Egon, 2011. "Ist es an der Zeit, die Aktionärsrechte zu stärken?," Working Papers 0156, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    • Handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0156
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/iso/ISU_WPS/156_ISU_full.pdf
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://www.unternehmung.nomos.de/fileadmin/unternehmung/doc/Aufsatz_DU_11_03.pdf
    File Function: Published paper
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Furubotn, Eirik G, 1988. "Codetermination and the Modern Theory of the Firm: A Property-Rights Analysis," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(2), pages 165-181, April.
    2. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-349, June.
    3. Jacobson, Louis S & LaLonde, Robert J & Sullivan, Daniel G, 1993. "Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 685-709, September.
    4. Louis S. Jacobson & Robert J. LaLonde & Daniel G. Sullivan, 1993. "Long-term earnings losses of high-seniority displaced workers," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 17(Nov), pages 2-20.
    5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    6. Egon Franck, 2001. "Zur Verantwortung des Verwaltungsrats aus ökonomischer Sicht," Working Papers 0002, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    7. Brink, Alexander, 2011. "Spezifische Investitionen als Legitimationsgrundlage für Stakeholderansprüche," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 65(1), pages 50-68.
    8. Laura Casares Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, 2002. "Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 1857-1889, October.
    9. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432.
    10. Daines, Robert & Klausner, Michael, 2001. "Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 83-120, April.
    11. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    12. Fauver, Larry & Fuerst, Michael E., 2006. "Does good corporate governance include employee representation? Evidence from German corporate boards," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 673-710, December.
    13. Margit Osterloh & Bruno Frey, 2006. "Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as Directors," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(3), pages 325-345, September.
    14. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black & Margaret Blair, 2004. "Relational Investing And Firm Performance," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-30, March.
    15. Topel, Robert, 1990. "Specific capital and unemployment: Measuring the costs and consequences of job loss," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 181-214, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Franck Egon, 2012. "Zu den offenen Fragen des Board Primacy Konzeptes in der oekonomischen Theorie der Corporate Governance," Working Papers 0155, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    2. Gerald Eisenkopf & Stephan Nüesch, 2016. "Third Parties and Specific Investments," Schmalenbach Business Review, Springer;Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, vol. 17(2), pages 151-172, August.
    3. Franck, Egon, 2013. "Zu den offenen Fragen des Board Primacy Konzeptes in der Theorie der Corporate Governance," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 67(1), pages 23-35.
    4. Josef Falkinger, 2012. "Em-powering economics: Some thoughts on policy and financial markets," ECON - Working Papers 093, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Walgenbach, Peter, 2011. "Weg von der Agenturtheorie? Aber was dann?," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 65(4), pages 312-319.
    6. Kürsten, Wolfgang, 2013. "35 Jahre Jensen/Meckling und das Missverständnis um die (wahre) Zielfunktion der Aktionäre – Finanzierungstheoretisches Plädoyer zur Eignung der Principal-Agent-Theorie für die Lösung von Problemen de," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 67(1), pages 8-22.
    7. Kaserer, Christoph, 2011. "Mehr Aktionärsrechte und weniger Interessenskonflikte für eine verbesserte Corporate Governance," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 65(4), pages 320-327.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Franck, Egon, 2013. "Zu den offenen Fragen des Board Primacy Konzeptes in der Theorie der Corporate Governance," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 67(1), pages 23-35.
    2. Franck Egon, 2012. "Zu den offenen Fragen des Board Primacy Konzeptes in der oekonomischen Theorie der Corporate Governance," Working Papers 0155, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    3. Guidi, Marco G.D. & Hillier, Joe & Tarbert, Heather, 2010. "Successfully reshaping the ownership relationship by reducing ‘moral debt’ and justly distributing residual claims: The cases from Scott Bader Commonwealth and the John Lewis Partnership," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 318-328.
    4. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 107-156.
    5. Lippert, Inge, 2008. "Perspektivenverschiebungen in der Corporate Governance: Neuere Ansätze und Studien der Corporate-Governance-Forschung," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Knowledge, Production Systems and Work SP III 2008-302, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    6. Stephen J. Smulowitz & Didier Cossin & Hongze Lu, 2023. "Managerial Short-Termism and Corporate Social Performance: The Moderating Role of External Monitoring," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 188(4), pages 759-778, December.
    7. Céline Chatelin & Stéphane Trebucq, 2002. "Du processus d'élaboration du cadre conceptuel en gouvernance d'entreprise A development process Of a conceptual framework of corporate governance," Working Papers CREGO 1021201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    8. Howell, Jason W., 2017. "The survival of the U.S. dual class share structure," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 440-450.
    9. Roosenboom, Peter & van der Goot, Tjalling, 2005. "The effect of ownership and control on market valuation: Evidence from initial public offerings in The Netherlands," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 43-59.
    10. Ginglinger, Edith & Megginson, William & Waxin, Timothée, 2011. "Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 868-887, September.
    11. Alexander Brink, 2010. "Enlightened Corporate Governance: Specific Investments by Employees as Legitimation for Residual Claims," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 93(4), pages 641-651, June.
    12. Rose, Morgan J., 2009. "Heterogeneous impacts of staggered boards by ownership concentration," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 113-128, February.
    13. Gerald Eisenkopf & Stephan Nüesch, 2016. "Third Parties and Specific Investments," Schmalenbach Business Review, Springer;Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, vol. 17(2), pages 151-172, August.
    14. Mahoney, Joseph T., 2012. "Towards a Stakeholder Theory of Strategic Management," Working Papers 12-0100, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    15. Khosa,Amrinder & Ahmed,Kamran & Henry,Darren, 2019. "Ownership Structure, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Valuation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108492195.
    16. Corinne van Der Yeught & Line Bergery & Isabelle Dherment Férère, 2012. "Les compétences éthiques créent-elles de la valeur ?," Post-Print hal-00689805, HAL.
    17. Biot-Paquerot, Guillaume, 2006. "Organes de gouvernance et paradoxe démocratique: Le cas des conseils d’administration d’université [Democratic paradox and governance mediums: the case of university boards]," MPRA Paper 2302, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Desender, Kurt A. & Garcia-Cestona, Miguel A. & Crespi, Rafel & Aguilera, Ruth V., 2009. "Board Characteristics and Audit Fees: Why Ownership Structure Matters?," Working Papers 09-0107, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    19. Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 6309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. William S. Schulze & Michael H. Lubatkin & Richard N. Dino & Ann K. Buchholtz, 2001. "Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(2), pages 99-116, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0156. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: IBW IT (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/isuzhch.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.