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Fund Managers Fees: Estimation and Sensitivity Analysis Using Monte Carlo Simulation

  • Dorra Najar

Fund managers compensation is a particular problem area in terms of its tax treatment in the United States and some European countries. This problem originates in the difficulty of defining these particular forms of incentive and therefore their estimated fair value. Based on the literature, carried interest, which is one of the most common profit-sharing arrangements observed in practice, may be considered as an option characterized by several constraints. The use of classical option-pricing models is inappropriate to take into account all these constraints. In this paper, we build a model to estimate the expected revenue to managers as a function of their investor contracts and we test how this estimated revenue varies across the characteristics of funds. We used the Monte Carlo simulation model and we introduced the non-marketability discount of the carried interest in order to calculate its fair value. A sensitivity analysis is performed in order to show the change in the fair value of carried interest after the change of each criterion. We find sharp differences between venture capital (VC) and buyout (BO) funds and between “deal by deal funds” and “whole funds”.

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Paper provided by Department of Research, Ipag Business School in its series Working Papers with number 2014-195.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 25 Feb 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-195
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  1. Barclay, Michael J. & Pearson, Neil D. & Weisbach, Michael S., 1998. "Open-end mutual funds and capital-gains taxes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 3-43, July.
  2. Ayako Yasuda & Andrew Metrick, 2007. "The economics of private equity funds," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Oct.
  3. Gompers, Paul & Lerner, Josh, 1999. "An analysis of compensation in the U.S. venture capital partnership," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 3-44, January.
  4. Josh Lerner, 2002. "When Bureaucrats Meet Entrepreneurs: The Design of Effective "Public Venture Capital" Programmes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages F73-F84, February.
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  8. Bergemann, Dirk & Hege, Ulrich, 1998. "Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 703-735, August.
  9. Huddart, Steven & Lang, Mark, 1996. "Employee stock option exercises an empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 5-43, February.
  10. Longstaff, Francis A, 1995. " How Much Can Marketability Affect Security Values?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1767-74, December.
  11. Wruck, Karen Hopper, 1989. "Equity ownership concentration and firm value : Evidence from private equity financings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 3-28, June.
  12. Najar, Dorra & Johan, Sofia, 2011. "The Role of Corruption, Culture, and Law in Investment Fund Manager Fees," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6239, Paris Dauphine University.
  13. Sensoy, Berk A., 2009. "Performance evaluation and self-designated benchmark indexes in the mutual fund industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 25-39, April.
  14. Jaaskelainen, Mikko & Maula, Markku & Murray, Gordon, 2007. "Profit distribution and compensation structures in publicly and privately funded hybrid venture capital funds," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(7), pages 913-929, September.
  15. Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, 1998. "Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(5), pages 1589-1622, October.
  16. Lerner, Josh, 1999. "The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-Run Impact of the SBIR Program," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72(3), pages 285-318, July.
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