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Perfection of the Jury Rule by Rule-Reforming Voters

Author

Listed:
  • Krishna K Ladha

    (Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode)

Abstract

With no authority to change the constitution, a jury does the next best thing: it adopts the optimal rule given the constitution. At equilibrium, some jurors, called the rule reformers, vote independent of their information producing the second-best rule. The remaining jurors vote on the basis of their information enabling aggregation of the dispersed information. Arising from this asymmetric voting in a simultaneous jury game is an equivalence class of asymmetric strong Nash equilibria in pure strategies at which the information aggregation is at its best. Thus, the strategic act of rule reforming enables individual rationality to yield collective rationality. The coordination problem, as to which juror would play which role, can be solved by letting the jurors make a non-binding pre-play agreement specifying each juror’s role; the agreement is self enforcing. The results hold for any voting rule, and any costs of erroneous conviction and acquittal.

Suggested Citation

  • Krishna K Ladha, 2012. "Perfection of the Jury Rule by Rule-Reforming Voters," Working papers 103, Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode.
  • Handle: RePEc:iik:wpaper:103
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
    2. McLennan, Andrew, 1998. "Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 413-418, June.
    3. Wit, Jorgen, 1998. "Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 364-376, February.
    4. Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar, 2001. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 259-294, November.
    5. Feddersen, Timothy & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(1), pages 23-35, March.
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