Bureaucracy Norms and Market Size
This paper proposes a new model of market structure determination. It demonstrates that market structure need not be the result of ideology, political power, collusion among producers or the nature of the technology. In our setting, it is determined by bureaucrats who maximize their share of the industry profits. The approach is illustrated by studying the relationship between industry size and the existing institutional norm and by identifying the bureaucrats' most preferred norm. In the latter context, we establish the fundamental inverse relationship between the costs of interaction with government officials and industry size.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Josefstädterstr. 39, A-1080 Vienna, Austria|
Phone: ++43 - (0)1 - 599 91 - 0
Fax: ++43 - (0)1 - 599 91 - 555
Web page: http://www.ihs.ac.at
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Institute for Advanced Studies - Library, Josefstädterstr. 39, A-1080 Vienna, Austria|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hillman, Arye L. & Van Long, Ngo & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001.
"Protection, lobbying, and market structure,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 383-409, August.
- Long, N.V. & Soubeyran, A. & Hillman, A., 1998. "Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 98a24, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2000. "Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-12, CIRANO.
- Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
- Ignatius J. Horstmann & James R. Markusen, 1990. "Endogenous Market Structures in International Trade," NBER Working Papers 3283, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-1023, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:259. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Doris Szoncsitz)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.