Pre-assigned rents and bureaucratic friction
In this paper we study the endogenous determination of bureaucratic friction in a bureaucratic contest with ( ) and without (n=1) rent contestability. When n= 1 bureaucratic impediments induce the individual to undertake rent-securing activities at the same level as in the two-player rent-seeking contest. However, under rent contestability the bureaucracy no longer serves as a means of extracting resources from the public. The paper concludes with the study of the effect of ‘net costs’ on bureaucratic friction. It turns out that under cotestability the only reason for creating bureaucratic friction is the ‘negative costs’ it incurs while when n=1 the effect of the bureaucrat's net costs of generating bureaucratic friction on the optimal degree of such friction is ambiguous. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002
Volume (Year): 3 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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