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Optimal Licensing of Non-Drastic and (Super-)Drastic Innovations: The Case of the Inside Patent Holder

Listed author(s):
  • Cuihong Fan

    ()

    (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

  • Byoung Heon Jun

    ()

    (Korea University, Seoul)

  • Elmar G. Wolfstetter

    ()

    (Humboldt-University at Berlin and Korea University, Seoul)

We reconsider the inside innovators’ optimal licensing problem, assuming incomplete information and unit cost profiles that may or may not have the potential to propel a monopoly, taking into account restrictions concerning royalty rates and the use of exclusive licenses implied by antitrust rules. We analyze optimal licensing mechanisms using methods developed in the analysis of license auctions with downstream interaction. The optimal mechanism differs significantly from the mechanisms reported in the literature, which assumed complete information or particular cost profiles or probability distributions.

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File URL: http://econ.korea.ac.kr/~ri/WorkingPapers/w1610.pdf
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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Korea University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 1610.

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Date of creation: 2016
Handle: RePEc:iek:wpaper:1610
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  1. Vishwasrao, Sharmila, 2007. "Royalties vs. fees: How do firms pay for foreign technology?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 741-759, August.
  2. Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2007. "License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 199, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  3. Eric Brousseau & Régis Coeurderoy & Camille Chaserant, 2007. "The Governance of Contracts: Empirical Evidence on Technology Licensing Agreements," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(2), pages 205-235, June.
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