The optimal allocation of prizes in contests: An auction approach
We characterize the optimal structure of prizes in contests, when the contest designer is interested in the maximization of either the expected total e¢çort or the expected highest e¢çort. The all-pay auction framework in the present paper makes it possible to derive all the results in Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela's (2001, American Economic Review, 542-558) incomplete-information model of contests as well as other results in a particularly simple fashion.
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- Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2012.
"Carrots And Sticks: Prizes And Punishments In Contests,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 453-462, 04.
- Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2010. "Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests," Working Papers tecipa-399, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Benny Modovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2008. "Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests," Working Papers 0802, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner & Shi, Xianwen, 2008. "Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 6770, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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