Internet Interconnection and Network Neutrality
We analyze competition between interconnected networks when content is heterogeneous in its sensitivity to delivery quality. In a two-sided market framework, we characterize the equilibrium in a neutral network constrained to offer the same quality and assess the impact of such a constraint vis-à-vis a non-neutral network where Internet service providers (ISPs) are allowed to engage in second degree price discrimination with a menu of quality-price pairs. We find that the merit of net neutrality regulation depends crucially on content providers' business models. More generally, our analysis can be considered as a contribution to the literature on second-degree price discrimination in two-sided platform markets.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2012|
|Publication status:||Published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 7, n°3, 2015, p. 103-141.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 TOULOUSE|
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