Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process
We analyze the contract between an innovator and a developer, when the former has private information on his idea and the latter must exert efforts but may also quit the relationship after having been informed. We show that the equilibrium contracts distort downwards the developer's incentives but in different ways according to the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR). For example, with intermediate IPR, only pooling contracts arise with a limited amount of information revealed.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, vol.�101, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Paris, 2011, p.�287-306.|
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