Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process
We analyze the contract between an innovator and a developer, when the former has private information on his idea and the latter must exert efforts but may also quit the relationship after having been informed. We show that the equilibrium contracts distort downwards the developer's incentives but in different ways according to the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR). For example, with intermediate IPR, only pooling contracts arise with a limited amount of information revealed.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2009|
|Publication status:||Published in Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, vol. 101, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Paris, 2011, p. 287-306.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: (+33) 5 61 12 86 23|
Web page: http://www.tse-fr.eu/
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- David D. Friedman & William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1991. "Some Economics of Trade Secret Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 61-72, Winter.
- Martimort, D. & Poudou, J.-C. & Sand-Zantman, W., 2006.
"Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information,"
Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers)
2006.19, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
- David Martimort & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2010. "Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information," Post-Print halshs-00754443, HAL.
- Martimort, David & Poudou, Jean-Christophe & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2009. "Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information," IDEI Working Papers 448, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Martimort, David & Poudou, Jean-Christophe & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2009. "Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information," TSE Working Papers 09-058, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
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