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Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process

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  • Martimort, David
  • Poudou, Jean-Christophe
  • Sand-Zantman, Wilfried

Abstract

We analyze the contract between an innovator and a developer, when the former has private information on his idea and the latter must exert efforts but may also quit the relationship after having been informed. We show that the equilibrium contracts distort downwards the developer's incentives but in different ways according to the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR). For example, with intermediate IPR, only pooling contracts arise with a limited amount of information revealed.

Suggested Citation

  • Martimort, David & Poudou, Jean-Christophe & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2009. "Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process," TSE Working Papers 09-053, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:21957
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David D. Friedman & William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1991. "Some Economics of Trade Secret Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 61-72, Winter.
    2. Martimort, D. & Poudou, J.-C. & Sand-Zantman, W., 2006. "Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2006.19, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
    3. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 1991. "Contrats de licences et asymétrie d'information," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 24, pages 189-208.
    4. repec:adr:anecst:y:1991:i:24:p:08 is not listed on IDEAS
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