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Impact of Regional Market Power on Natural Gas Transport Network Size

Author

Listed:
  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques
  • Gasmi, Farid
  • Oviedo, Juan Daniel

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Gasmi, Farid & Oviedo, Juan Daniel, 2003. "Impact of Regional Market Power on Natural Gas Transport Network Size," IDEI Working Papers 168, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:1636
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    File URL: https://tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2003/gaz_transport.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Severin Borenstein & James. Bushnell & Steven Stoft, 2000. "The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in A Deregulated Electricity Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 294-325, Summer.
    2. Cremer, Helmuth & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2002. "Competition in gas markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 928-935, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Brandão, António & Soares, Isabel & Sarmento, Paula & Resende, Joana & Pinho, Joana, 2014. "Regulating international gas transport: Welfare effects of postage stamp and entry–exit systems," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 86-95.
    2. António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Joana Resende & Paula Sarmento & Isabel Soares, 2016. "Welfare effects of unbundling under different regulatory regimes in natural gas markets," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 15(2), pages 99-127, August.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities

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