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Private Entrepreneurs In Public Services: A Longitudinal Examination Of Outsourcing and Statization Of Prisons

  • Cabral, Sandro
  • Lazzarini, Sergio G.
  • Azevedo, Paulo F.

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File URL: http://www.insper.edu.br/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2011_wpe242.pdf
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Paper provided by Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa in its series Insper Working Papers with number wpe_242.

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Date of creation: Oct 2011
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Handle: RePEc:ibm:ibmecp:wpe_242
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  1. Sandro Cabral & Sergio Lazzarini & Paulo Azevedo, 2010. "Private operation with public supervision: evidence of hybrid modes of governance in prisons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 281-293, October.
  2. Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, 2010. "CONTRACTING FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM U.S. CITIES -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 507-541, 09.
  3. Bennett, John & Elisabetta Iossa, 2002. "Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 22, Royal Economic Society.
  4. Coase, R H, 1974. "The Lighthouse in Economics," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 357-76, October.
  5. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Kremer & Atif Mian, 2003. "Incentives in Markets, Firms and Governments," NBER Working Papers 9802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Williamson, Oliver E, 1999. "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 306-42, April.
  7. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2002. "Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 39-84, February.
  8. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1778, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  9. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
  10. Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, 2007. "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," NBER Working Papers 13350, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Mahoney, Joseph & McGahan, Anita & Pitelis, Christos, 2009. "The Interdependence of Private and Public Interests," Papers DYNREG40, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
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