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Influence of the Premium Subsidy on Farmers' Crop Insurance Coverage Decisions

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Abstract

The Agricultural Risk Protection Act greatly increased the expected marginal net benefit of farmers buying high-coverage crop insurance policies by coupling premium subsidies to coverage level. This policy change, combined with cross-sectional variations in expected marginal net benefits of high-coverage policies, is used to estimate the role that premium subsidies play in farmers' crop insurance decisions. We use county data for corn, soybeans, and wheat to estimate regression equations that are then used to obtain insight into two policy scenarios. We first estimate that eventual adoption of actuarially fair incremental premiums, combined with current coupled subsidies, would increase farmers' purchase of high-coverage policies by almost 400 percent from 1998 levels across the three crops and two plans of insurance included in the analysis. We then estimate that a return to decoupled subsidies would decrease farmers' high-coverage purchase decisions by an average of 36 percent.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce A. Babcock & Chad E. Hart, 2005. "Influence of the Premium Subsidy on Farmers' Crop Insurance Coverage Decisions," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 05-wp393, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
  • Handle: RePEc:ias:cpaper:05-wp393
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. O'Donoghue, Erik J., 2013. "The Demand for Crop Insurance: How Important are the Subsidies?," 2013 AAEA: Crop Insurance and the Farm Bill Symposium, October 8-9, Louisville, KY 157282, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    2. Yi, Jing & Richardson, James & Bryant, Henry, 2016. "How Do Premium Subsidies Affect Crop Insurance Demand at Different Coverage Levels: the Case of Corn," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, 2016, Boston, Massachusetts 236249, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Ginder, Matthew G. & Spaulding, Aslihan D., 2006. "Factors Affecting Crop Insurance Purchase Decisions in Northern Illinois," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21073, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    4. Heidelbach, Olaf & Bokusheva, Raushan, 2009. "Crop insurance market development in a transition economy: The case of Kazakhstan," 2009 Conference, August 16-22, 2009, Beijing, China 51614, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. O'Donoghue, Erik, 2014. "The Effects of Premium Subsidies on Demand for Crop Insurance," Economic Research Report 178405, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    6. Heidelbach, Olaf, 2007. "Efficiency of selected risk management instruments: An empirical analysis of risk reduction in Kazakhstani crop production," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), volume 40, number 92323.
    7. Gerloff, Delton C., 2006. "The Viability of a Crop Insurance Investment Account: The Case for Obion, County, Tennessee," 2006 Annual Meeting, February 5-8, 2006, Orlando, Florida 35429, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    8. O'Donoghue, Erik, 2014. "Crop Insurance Subsidies: How Important are They?," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 169451, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

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    Keywords

    Agricultural Risk Protection Act; crop insurance; premium subsidies.;

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