IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iae/iaewps/wp2011n19.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

External Ventures: Why Firms Don't Develop All Their Inventions In-house

Author

Listed:
  • Russell Thomson

    (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, and Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia (IPRIA), The University of Melbourne)

  • Elizabeth Webster

    (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, and Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia (IPRIA), The University of Melbourne)

Abstract

In this paper we consider why firms sometimes choose an external development path for their own inventions, despite the costs of contracting and the risks of opportunistic behaviour and expropriation. We model the probability that firms adopt an external development strategy using survey data from over 2700 Australian inventions. Our results indicate that firms pursue external development strategies in response to perceived project-level risk about the technical feasibility of the invention, especially when suported by confidence in the patent system. Our findings also confirm that small to medium size enterprises, highly leveraged large firms and firms with few co-specialized assets are more likely to pursue an external development strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Russell Thomson & Elizabeth Webster, 2011. "External Ventures: Why Firms Don't Develop All Their Inventions In-house," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2011n19, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    • Handle: RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2011n19
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://melbourneinstitute.unimelb.edu.au/downloads/working_paper_series/wp2011n19.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joshua D. Angrist & Alan B. Krueger, 2001. "Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 69-85, Fall.
    2. David J. Teece, 2003. "Competition, Cooperation, and Innovation Organizational Arrangements for Regimes of Rapid Technological Progress," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Essays In Technology Management And Policy Selected Papers of David J Teece, chapter 16, pages 447-474, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. David J. TEECE, 2008. "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Transfer And Licensing Of Know-How And Intellectual Property Understanding the Multinational Enterprise in the Modern World, chapter 5, pages 67-87, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Bruno Cassiman & Masako Ueda, 2006. "Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-ups," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(2), pages 262-275, February.
    5. Gambardella, Alfonso & Giuri, Paola & Luzzi, Alessandra, 2007. "The market for patents in Europe," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1163-1183, October.
    6. Scott Shane, 2001. "Technology Regimes and New Firm Formation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(9), pages 1173-1190, September.
    7. Giuseppe Scellato, 2007. "Patents, firm size and financial constraints: an empirical analysis for a panel of Italian manufacturing firms," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(1), pages 55-76, January.
    8. Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, 2000. "The Structure of Licensing Contracts," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 103-135, March.
    9. Anand, Bharat N & Khanna, Tarun, 2000. "The Structure of Licensing Contracts," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 103-135, March.
    10. William Griffiths & Paul H. Jensen & Elizabeth Webster, 2011. "What Creates Abnormal Profits?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 58(3), pages 323-346, July.
    11. Brozen, Yale, 1971. "The Persistence of 'High Rates of Return' in High-Stable Concentration Industries," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(2), pages 501-512, October.
    12. S.A. Lippman & R.P. Rumelt, 1982. "Uncertain Imitability: An Analysis of Interfirm Differences in Efficiency under Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 418-438, Autumn.
    13. Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, 2009. "Complementarity Among Vertical Integration Decisions: Evidence from Automobile Product Development," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(2), pages 311-332, February.
    14. Carlos Carreira & Filipe Silva, 2010. "No Deep Pockets: Some Stylized Empirical Results On Firms’ Financial Constraints," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 731-753, September.
    15. Veugelers, Reinhilde & Cassiman, Bruno, 1999. "Make and buy in innovation strategies: evidence from Belgian manufacturing firms," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 63-80, January.
    16. Tat Chan & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2007. "Strategic Management of R& D Pipelines with Cospecialized Investments and Technology Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(4), pages 667-682, April.
    17. Newey, Whitney K., 1987. "Efficient estimation of limited dependent variable models with endogenous explanatory variables," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 231-250, November.
    18. Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, 2006. "Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, and Firms' Incentives for Technology Licensing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(2), pages 293-308, February.
    19. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Joshua S. Gans & David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, 2002. "When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 571-586, Winter.
    21. George Symeonidis, 1996. "Innovation, Firm Size and Market Structure: Schumpeterian Hypotheses and Some New Themes," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 161, OECD Publishing.
    22. Eugen Mattes & Michael C. Stacey & Dora Marinova, 2006. "Surveying inventors listed on patents to investigate determinants of innovation," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 69(3), pages 475-498, December.
    23. Kollmer, Holger & Dowling, Michael, 2004. "Licensing as a commercialisation strategy for new technology-based firms," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1141-1151, October.
    24. Alessandra Canepa & Paul Stoneman, 2008. "Financial constraints to innovation in the UK: evidence from CIS2 and CIS3," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 711-730, October.
    25. Joshua Angrist & Alan Krueger, 2001. "Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments," Working Papers 834, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    26. Chris Freeman & Luc Soete, 1997. "The Economics of Industrial Innovation, 3rd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 3, volume 1, number 0262061953, December.
    27. Richardson, G B, 1972. "The Organisation of Industry," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 82(327), pages 883-896, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Schwiebacher, Franz, 2013. "Does fragmented or heterogeneous IP ownership stifle investments in innovation?," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-096, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. O'Connell, Vincent & Lee, Jong-Ho & O'Sullivan, Don, 2018. "The influence of CEO equity incentives on licensing," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 266-277.
    3. Figueroa, Nicolás & Serrano, Carlos J., 2019. "Patent trading flows of small and large firms," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(7), pages 1601-1616.
    4. Gambardella, Alfonso & Giuri, Paola & Luzzi, Alessandra, 2007. "The market for patents in Europe," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1163-1183, October.
    5. Giuri, Paola & Mariani, Myriam, 2007. "Inventors and invention processes in Europe: Results from the PatVal-EU survey," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1105-1106, October.
    6. Lee, Honggi, 2023. "The heterogeneous effects of patent scope on licensing propensity," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(3).
    7. Arvids A. Ziedonis, 2007. "Real Options in Technology Licensing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(10), pages 1618-1633, October.
    8. Ming Li & Xiangdong Chen & Gupeng Zhang, 2017. "How does firm size affect technology licensing? Empirical evidence from China," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 112(3), pages 1249-1269, September.
    9. Paola Giuri & Myriam Mariani & Stefano Brusoni & Gustavo Crespi & Dominique Francoz & Alfonso Gambardella & Walter Garcia-Fontes & Aldo Geuna & Raul Gonzales & Dietmar Harhoff & Karin Hoisl & Christia, 2005. "Everything you Always Wanted to Know about Inventors (but Never Asked): Evidence from the PatVal-EU Survey," LEM Papers Series 2005/20, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    10. Moreira, Solon & Klueter, Thomas Maximilian & Asija, Aman, 2023. "Market for technology 2.0? Reassessing the role of complementary assets on licensing decisions," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(7).
    11. Catalina Martinez & Pluvia Zuniga, 2017. "Contracting for technology transfer: patent licensing and know-how in Brazil," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(6), pages 659-689, August.
    12. Arora, Ashish & Gambardella, Alfonso, 2010. "The Market for Technology," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 641-678, Elsevier.
    13. Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, 2006. "Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, and Firms' Incentives for Technology Licensing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(2), pages 293-308, February.
    14. Lichtenthaler, Ulrich, 2010. "Determinants of proactive and reactive technology licensing: A contingency perspective," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 55-66, February.
    15. Cabaleiro, Goretti, 2019. "Sources of appropriation capacity in licensing agreements," Technovation, Elsevier, vol. 86, pages 48-61.
    16. Jean-François Sattin, 2016. "Exploring the survival of patent licensing: some evidence from French foreign agreements," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 610-630, June.
    17. Keld Laursen & Solon Moreira & Toke Reichstein & Maria Isabella Leone, 2017. "Evading the Boomerang Effect: Using the Grant-Back Clause to Further Generative Appropriability from Technology Licensing Deals," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 514-530, June.
    18. Ulrich Lichtenthaler & Holger Ernst & Martin Hoegl, 2010. "Not-Sold-Here: How Attitudes Influence External Knowledge Exploitation," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(5), pages 1054-1071, October.
    19. Kelchtermans, Stijn & Leten, Bart & Rabijns, Maarten & Riccaboni, Massimo, 2022. "Do licensors learn from out-licensing? Empirical evidence from the pharmaceutical industry," Technovation, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    20. Federico Frattini & Mattia Bianchi & Simone Franzó, 2019. "Identifying Factors Influencing The Price Of Technology Licenses: A Framework Grounded In Negotiation Research," International Journal of Innovation Management (ijim), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 23(05), pages 1-34, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Outsourcing R&D; managing technological risk; licensing innovation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2011n19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sheri Carnegie (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mimelau.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.