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Voluntary Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance: The Empirical Evidence on Earnings Forecasts

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  • Naohito Abe
  • Yessica C.Y. Chung

Abstract

This study investigates the determinants of companies' voluntary information disclosure. Employing a large and unique dataset on the companies' own earnings forecasts and their frequencies, we conducted an empirical analysis of the effects of a firm's ownership, board, and capital structures on information disclosure. Our finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the custom of cross-holding among companies strengthens entrenchment by managers. We also find that bank directors force managers to disclose information more frequently. In addition, our results show the borrowing ratio is positively associated with information frequency, suggesting that the manager is likely to reveal more when his or her firm borrows money from financial institutions. However, additional borrowings beyond the minimum level of effective borrowings decrease the management's disclosing incentive.

Suggested Citation

  • Naohito Abe & Yessica C.Y. Chung, 2007. "Voluntary Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance: The Empirical Evidence on Earnings Forecasts," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d06-203, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hst:hstdps:d06-203
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voluntary information Disclosure; Corporate Governance; management earnings forecast;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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