IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/umnees/0749.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal Tax and Expenditure Policy in the Presence of Migration - Are Credit Restrictions Important?

Author

Listed:
  • Backlund, Kenneth

    (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

  • Sjögren, Tomas

    (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

  • Stage, Jesper

    (Department of Social Sciences, Mid Sweden University)

Abstract

This paper concerns optimal income taxation in the presence of emigration. The basic model is a two-period model where all agents are identical and live in the home country in the first period of life, but where some emigrate at the end of the first period. It is shown that with a binding credit restriction, the government will tax labor income in the first period at a higher rate than otherwise, whereas the labor income tax in the second period is unaffected by emigration. With heterogenous agents, the labor income tax in period two will be affected by emigration.

Suggested Citation

  • Backlund, Kenneth & Sjögren, Tomas & Stage, Jesper, 2008. "Optimal Tax and Expenditure Policy in the Presence of Migration - Are Credit Restrictions Important?," Umeå Economic Studies 749, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0749
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.umu.se/DownloadAsset.action?contentId=47219&languageId=3&assetKey=ues749
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aronsson, Thomas & Blomquist, Soren, 2003. "Optimal taxation, global externalities and labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2749-2764, December.
    2. Yasuhiro Sato, 2004. "Migration, Frictional Unemployment, and Welfare‐Improving Labor Policies," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 773-793, November.
    3. Boadway, Robin & Keen, Michael, 1999. "Redistribution," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 273411, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
    4. Wilson, John Douglas, 1992. "Optimal Income Taxation and International Personal Mobility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 191-196, May.
    5. Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2006. "Optimal Linear Income Tax when Agents Vote with their Feet," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(3), pages 393-415, September.
    6. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Vigneault, Marianne, 1998. "The consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 453-478, June.
    7. Wilson, John D., 1982. "Optimal linear income taxation in the presence of emigration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 363-379, August.
    8. Kjetil Bjorvatn, 1998. "Taxation and Migration in a Federal System," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 5(3), pages 345-355, July.
    9. Boadway, Robin & Keen, Michael, 2000. "Redistribution," Handbook of Income Distribution, in: A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (ed.), Handbook of Income Distribution, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 677-789, Elsevier.
    10. Petter Osmundsen, 1999. "Taxing Internationally Mobile Individuals—A Case of Countervailing Incentives," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 6(2), pages 149-164, May.
    11. Pirttila, Jukka & Tuomala, Matti, 2001. "On optimal non-linear taxation and public good provision in an overlapping generations economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 485-501, March.
    12. Wildasin, David E, 1991. "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 757-774, September.
    13. Petter Osmundsen & Guttorm Schjelderup & Kåre Petter Hagen, 2000. "Personal income taxation under mobility, exogenous and endogenous welfare weights, and asymmetric information," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 13(4), pages 623-637.
    14. Wilson, John D., 1982. "Optimal income taxation and migration : A world welfare point of view," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 381-397, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Aronsson, Thomas, 2007. "General Income Taxation, Public Goods and Decentralized Leadership," Umeå Economic Studies 715, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    2. Aronsson, Thomas & Blomquist, Soren, 2003. "Optimal taxation, global externalities and labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2749-2764, December.
    3. Jean Gabszewicz & Ornella Tarola & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2016. "Migration, wages and income taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(3), pages 434-453, June.
    4. Koethenbuerger, Marko, 2008. "Federal tax-transfer policy and intergovernmental pre-commitment," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 16-31, January.
    5. Simula, L. & Trannoy, A., 2006. "Optimal Non-Linear Income Tax when Highly Skilled Individuals Vote with their Feet," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0656, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    6. Diego Martínez, 2008. "Optimal Federal Taxes with Public Inputs," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 64(4), pages 422-433, December.
    7. Tóbiás, Áron, 2016. "Income redistribution in open economies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 19-34.
    8. Etienne Lehmann & Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2014. "Tax me if you can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Between Competing Governments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(4), pages 1995-2030.
    9. Diego Martínez López, 2004. "Vertical externalities in the provision of public inputs," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/47, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    10. Martí­nez-López, Diego, 2005. "Fiscal federalism and public inputs provision: vertical externalities matter," Working Paper Series 484, European Central Bank.
    11. Rizzo, Leonzio, 2007. "Interaction between vertical and horizontal tax competition: evidence and some theory," MPRA Paper 8632, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2008.
    12. Vander LUCAS, 2001. "Cross-Border Shopping in a Federalist Economy," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2002018, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), revised 28 May 2002.
    13. Rizzo, Leonzio, 2005. "Interaction between Vertical and Horizontal tax Competition: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 5334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Paul Beaudry & Charles Blackorby & Dezsö Szalay, 2009. "Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 216-242, March.
    15. Herwig Immervoll & Horacio Levy & Christine Lietz & Daniela Mantovani & Cathal O’Donoghue & Holly Sutherland & Gerlinde Verbist, 2006. "Household Incomes and Redistribution in the European Union: Quantifying the Equalizing Properties of Taxes and Benefits," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Dimitri B. Papadimitriou (ed.), The Distributional Effects of Government Spending and Taxation, chapter 5, pages 135-165, Palgrave Macmillan.
    16. Massimo Morelli & Huanxing Yang & Lixin Ye, 2012. "Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 142-175, February.
    17. Pierre Pestieau & Maria Racionero, 2015. "Tagging with leisure needs," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 687-706, December.
    18. Alessandro Balestrino & Alessandro Cigno & Anna Pettini, 2002. "Endogenous Fertility and the Design of Family Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(2), pages 175-193, March.
    19. William B. P. Robson, 2001. "Six Pillars of Social Policy: The State of Pensions and Health Care in Canada," The State of Economics in Canada: Festschrift in Honour of David Slater, in: Patrick Grady & Andrew Sharpe (ed.),The State of Economics in Canada: Festschrift in Honour of David Slater, pages 183-224, Centre for the Study of Living Standards.
    20. Henrik Jordahl & Luca Micheletto, 2005. "Optimal Utilitarian Taxation and Horizontal Equity," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(4), pages 681-708, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0749. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David Skog (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inumuse.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.