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Personal income taxation under mobility, exogenous and endogenous welfare weights, and asymmetric information

Author

Listed:
  • Petter Osmundsen

    () (Stavanger University College, Section of Petroleum Economics, PO Box 2557 Ullandhaug, 4004 Stavanger, Norway.)

  • Guttorm Schjelderup

    () (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Helleveien 30, 5035 Bergen-Sandviben, Norway)

  • Kåre Petter Hagen

    () (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Helleveien 30, 5035 Bergen-Sandviben, Norway)

Abstract

This paper analyses how governments should tax labour income accruing to a group of highly skilled and geographically mobile individuals who divide their time or career between several jurisdictions. The analysis differs from previous models on migration and taxation by addressing optimal regulation when agents work for several principals. Optimal taxation is developed for social welfare functions with exogenous and endogenous welfare weights. Marginal income taxes are applied for screening purposes, and the rates are lower with endogenous than with exogenous welfare weights.

Suggested Citation

  • Petter Osmundsen & Guttorm Schjelderup & Kåre Petter Hagen, 2000. "Personal income taxation under mobility, exogenous and endogenous welfare weights, and asymmetric information," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 13(4), pages 623-637.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:13:y:2000:i:4:p:623-637
    Note: Received: 22 January 1998/Accepted: 3 July 1999)
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    Cited by:

    1. Kenneth Backlund & Tomas Sjögren & Jesper Stage, 2014. "Optimal tax and expenditure policy in the presence of emigration: Are credit restrictions important?," Indian Growth and Development Review, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 7(2), pages 98-117, November.
    2. Vilen Lipatov & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 2010. "Optimal Income Taxation with Tax Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 3108, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism design; asymmetric information; optimal income taxation;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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